Incumbency, turnout, and impact of legislature size on government spending : evidence from Italian municipalities by De Benedetto, Marco Alberto
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Incumbency, Turnout, and Impact of Legislature Size on 
Government Spending: Evidence from Italian 
Municipalities1 
 
 
Marco Alberto De Benedetto 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Economics, Mathematics and Statistics 
 
2018 
 
                                                          
1 The first chapter of my dissertation titled “The Impact of Incumbency on Turnout. Evidence from 
Italian Municipalities” is a joint work with Professor Maria De Paola (Department of Economics, 
University of Calabria). It has also appeared as IZA Working Paper no. 7612 and it has been 
published on Electoral Studies Journal, Vol. 44: 98-108 in 2016. The second chapter titled 
“Incumbency Advantage at Municipal Elections in Italy: A Quasi-Experimental Approach”also 
appeared as a Birkbeck Working Paper no. 1408. I declare that the second and third chapters have 
not been coauthored and have been written by myself. 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my parents… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
3 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Aknowledgements .................................................................................................... 6 
Abstract .................................................................................................................... 7 
Introduction .............................................................................................................. 8 
 
CHAPTER 1: The Impact of Incumbency on Turnout. Evidence from Italian 
Municipalities ......................................................................................................... 17 
1.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 17 
1.2 Institutional Setting and Data ........................................................................... 25 
1.3 Incumbency Status and Voter Turnout: Municipal Fixed Effects Estimates ... 28 
1.4 Instrumental Variable Estimates ...................................................................... 32 
1.5 Concluding Remarks ........................................................................................ 42 
 
CHAPTER 2: Incumbency Advantage at Municipal Elections in Italy: A Quasi-
Experimental Approach ......................................................................................... 44 
2.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 44 
2.2 Previous Measures of Incumbency Advantage and Methodology ................... 51 
2.2.1 How to Measure the Personal Incumbency Advantage ................................ 51 
2.2.2 Methodology ................................................................................................. 54 
2.3 Institutional Framework and Data .................................................................... 57 
2.3.1 Smoothness Conditions and Validity of the Sharp RDD .............................. 61 
2.4 Sharp RDD Estimates: Main Results ............................................................... 65 
2.5 Robustness Checks ........................................................................................... 74 
2.6 Concluding Remarks ........................................................................................ 76 
 
CHAPTER 3: The Effect of Council Size on Municipal Expenditures: Evidence 
from Italian Municipalities ..................................................................................... 81 
3.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 81 
3.2 Institutional Setting and Data Description ....................................................... 85 
3.3 Methodology .................................................................................................... 90 
3.4 Smoothness Condition and other Potential Confounds .................................... 93 
3.5 Empirical Results: Sharp RDD Estimates ........................................................ 97 
3.6 Robustness Checks ......................................................................................... 102 
3.6.1 Regression with Discontinuity Samples...................................................... 102 
4 
 
3.6.2 Exogenous Variation in the Council Size: Mayor’s Wage Threat .............. 103 
3.7 Concluding Remarks ...................................................................................... 105 
 
Conclusions .......................................................................................................... 107 
References ............................................................................................................ 113 
 
List of Tables 
 
Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics ............................................................................. 27 
Table 1.2: Municipal fixed effects estimates. Incumbency and Voter Turnout ..... 31 
Table 1.3: TSLS Estimates. Incumbency Effect on Voter Turnout ....................... 34 
Table 1.4: TSLS Estimates. Incumbency Effect on Voter Turnout: North vs 
South ...................................................................................................................... 36 
Table 1.5: TSLS Estimates. Incumbency Effect on Voter Turnout According to 
the Social Capital Distribution (blood donations) .................................................. 39 
Table 1.6: TSLS Estimates. Incumbency Effect on Voter Turnout According to 
the Level of Organized Crime ................................................................................ 41 
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics ............................................................................. 60 
Table 2.2: Incumbency Effect and Predetermined Characteristics ........................ 63 
Table 2.3: RDD Estimates – Personal Incumbency Advantage ............................. 70 
Table 2.4: RDD Estimates – Personal Incumbency Advantage South vs North ... 72 
Table 2.5: RDD Estimates – Personal Incumbency Advantage – Discontinuity 
Samples .................................................................................................................. 76 
Table 2.6: RDD Estimates – Personal Incumbency Advantage – Interaction 
Terms...................................................................................................................... 77 
Table 3.1: Council Size for Italian Municipalities- Legislative Decree no. 
267/2000 ................................................................................................................. 86 
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics ............................................................................. 89 
Table 3.3: Test for Difference-in-Mean ................................................................. 95 
Table 3.4: Discontinuity in State and Region Capital and Current Grants- OLS 
Results .................................................................................................................... 97 
Table 3.5: Local Expenditures and Council Size- Sharp RDD ............................ 100 
Table 3.6: Pork Barrel Policies and Council Size- Sharp RDD Results .............. 101 
5 
 
Table 3.7: Sharp RDD Results for Discontinuity Samples .................................. 103 
Table 3.8: The Effect of Mayors Wage on Municipal Expenditures: LLR Results 
with a Bandwidth of ±20% .................................................................................. 105 
 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 2.1: McCrary test – Manipulation Assignment Variable ............................ 65 
Figure 2.2: RDD Estimates – Incumbency Advantage .......................................... 69 
Figure 3.1: Discontinuity in Council Size .............................................................. 87 
Figure 3.2: Discontinuity in the Pre-determined Characteristics ........................... 94 
 
 
 
  
6 
 
Aknowledgements 
 
First of all, I would like to thank my supervisor Professor Walter Beckert for his 
excellent advice that enabled me to reach this new target. Thanks also to Professor 
Maria De Paola for conveying the passion for research and teaching to me. 
Thanks to my best friends Alfonsina and Serena for their continued support, to 
Caterina and Cristina for having been there for me in the time of need. Last but not 
least, thanks to Giovanni who colours my days. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
7 
 
Abstract 
 
My thesis focuses on some of the determinants of electoral participation (input side 
of democratic legitimacy) and on the effect of legislature size on the quality of 
government (output side of democratic legitimacy). In chapter 1 I analyze how 
having an incumbent among candidates affects electoral turnout, by using a data 
set providing information on the results of Italian municipal elections over the 
period 1993-2011. Endogeneity issues are handled through an instrumental 
variable approach using the mayor term-limit as an instrument for the presence of 
the incumbent mayor among candidates. I find that the impact of incumbency is 
heterogeneous across geographical areas. I speculate that the north-south 
divergence is related to differences in social capital and in clientelistic 
relationships established by incumbent politicians.  
In chapter 2, I examine the personal incumbency effect at a local level in Italy 
over the period 1993-2011, by applying a non-parametric Sharp Regression 
Discontinuity Design that compares candidates who barely win an election to those 
who barely lose, exploiting the fact that incumbency status changes discontinuously 
at the threshold of margin of victory of zero. I find that incumbents are more likely 
to win the competition compared to their challengers at the Italian municipal 
elections. Also, the effect of interest seems to be larger in magnitude for 
municipalities located in the North of Italy compared to southern municipalities. 
Finally, in chapter 3 I study the effect of council size on municipal expenditures 
by using a rich data set providing information on Italian municipal budgets over 
the period 2001-2007. By implementing a Sharp Regression Discontinuity Design, 
I find a negative relationship between local government size, as measured by total 
expenditures per capita, and the council size. Similar results are found when I 
consider expenditures that are more directly under the control of bureaucrats, such 
as current expenditures per capita. Finally, I test the "law of 1/n" on pork barrel 
policies, finding again a negative effect of council size on capital expenditures per 
capita.  
 
Keywords: Incumbency; Political Competition; Electoral Turnout; Social Capital; 
Government Size; Legislature Size; Law of 1/n; Instrumental Variable; Natural 
Experiment; Sharp RDD. 
 
 
JEL classification: D72, D78; J71; J16 ; J45 
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Introduction 
 
 
Modern democracies are characterized by different degrees of citizen integration 
into politics2 and various levels of political efficiency3. In the political economy 
literature (see for instance, Rothstein and Teorell, 2008) it has been shown that both 
of them are important prerequisites of democratic legitimacy, i.e. the accepted right 
to exercise and use power. On the one hand, electoral participation has important 
effects on the functioning of democracy and on policies that will be implemented. 
Decades of research clearly show that low participation also means distorted 
participation: when participation is low, young, poor and low-educated people are 
usually less inclined to go to the polls and cast their votes, especially in a context 
of serious economic crises (Matsusaka and Palda, 1999; Lassen, 2005; Larcinese, 
2007). If they do not vote, what legitimacy do politicians have to represent their 
interests? Politics will increasingly have an incentive to not consider abstainers and 
focus only on electors who not only vote with a higher probability, but also know 
how to be well represented through lobbies, family connections, or more directly 
through the money that politicians use to create consensus during the electoral 
campaign. On the other hand, political efficiency and in turn, the quality of 
government is understood as regarding to how public institutions such as the public 
administration and judiciary implement public policies. Many studies have shown 
that the quality of government factors, such as control of corruption, the rule of law, 
and administrative competence, have a strong positive impact on most measures of 
                                                          
2 In Italy political participation tends to be higher for elections at national level (80.5 percent) 
compared to elections at regional (63.5 percent), European (66.5 percent) and municipal (71 percent) 
level respectively. Similar results hold true for other democracies like Germany and France. 
3 Political efficiency is defined as the capacity of government to effectively formulate and implement 
sound policies (Kauffman et al., 2004). 
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human well-being (e.g., infant mortality, life expectancy, and child poverty) and 
democratic legitimacy (see among others Sung, 2004; Rothstein and Teorell, 2008; 
Rothstein, 2011).  
In order to understand how some factors relate to output as well as input elements 
affecting democratic legitimacy, the focus of this thesis is on Italian local 
governments. Local government is usually an important link between citizens and 
the political-administrative system. In fact, it acts as the vehicle of local democracy, 
providing services responsive to local needs and conditions, and constitute the local 
branch of the nation-state administrative apparatus, executing state policies in key-
policy areas, where bureaucratic efficiency plays an important role (Pierre, 1990; 
Sharpe, 1970). Under the labels of “participatory democracy” or “deliberative 
democracy”, as in the Italian case, the main idea behind local government is the 
integration of citizens into the political decision making process and their 
‘education’ towards responsible and active members of the community. 
Conversely, from a “functionalist” side, local government is, at first sight, a services 
provider with efficient service delivery being the main objective (Kersting 
andVetter, 2003). 
The aim of my thesis is to highlight some of the determinants of electoral 
participation (input side of democratic legitimacy) as well as the effect of legislature 
size on the quality of government, and in turn on its efficiency (output side of 
democratic legitimacy). In particular, I firstly study the effect of incumbency on 
electoral turnout at the municipal level in Italy. The incumbency status could affect 
electoral participation through a number of channels which would lead to different 
results. Having an incumbent among candidates increases the availability of 
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information with ambiguous effects on turnout. Furthermore, voters’ choices to go 
to the polls and in turn, to cast their vote are influenced by their expectations about 
candidates’ behavior, including the incumbent, that depends for instance, on how 
well the incumbent’s past announcements reflect current tastes of the electorate. 
Secondly, I examine the candidate incumbency advantage in winning the electoral 
race, considering Italian municipal elections, since no author so far has analyzed 
whether incumbent mayors do or do not have an advantage in winning the 
competition compared to non-incumbent candidates for Italian elections. Thirdly, I 
analyze the effect of legislature size on government size, as measured by municipal 
expenditures, using a rich dataset providing detailed information on Italian 
municipal budgets, in order to empirically test the so-called “Law of 1/n”, i.e. the 
relationship between efficiency and legislature size.  
The aim of the first chapter of my thesis is to analyze one of the potential 
determinants of electoral participation, the effect of the incumbency status on voter 
turnout, using data on candidates who run for a mayor position in Italy. The effect 
arising from the status of incumbent on turnout is not unambiguous and may depend 
on a number of factors. First, if the voters are informed about the candidates, 
including the incumbent, and if he/she has performed well in the past, then a 
positive effect on voter turnout is expected. If, however, the incumbent is 
responsible for mismanagement, citizens may not be encouraged to go to the polls 
or they might decide to punish the incumbent casting the vote for another candidate, 
thereby increasing participation. A second aspect that should be considered is the 
level of political competition during the elections. If the electoral margin between 
the incumbent and his/her best challenger is very large, then the voters being almost 
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certain of the incumbent's victory may decide not to participate actively on the 
Election Day. Instead, if the competition is high, citizens understand that their vote 
is not marginal, but on the contrary could be decisive to give the victory to one of 
the candidates in the list, and in turn decide to participate in elections. 
Empirical works in the political economy literature studying the impact of 
candidates’ characteristics on electoral turnout are scant, especially in Italy, 
although candidates’ features matter in order to explain the variation in electoral 
participation. In fact, being informed about candidates’ skills is essential in making 
the right decision, and voters might rely on heuristics in choosing who to vote 
among a long list of candidates: a candidate will be favored compared to others only 
if the voter feels well represented. In this regard, some of the candidates’ 
characteristics, such as gender (McDermott, 1997), race (Sigelman and others, 
1995), sexual orientation (Golebiowska, 2001; Herrick and Thomas, 1999) and 
employment (McDermott, 2005), have been investigated in the literature as possible 
determinants of voter turnout.  
The first chapter of my thesis contributes to this strand of literature showing the 
effect of having been incumbent on electoral participation using revealed 
preference data: since voters must choose a candidate who is eligible to hold a 
particular office, qualifications and past experience are of particular relevance in 
terms of turnout.  
This chapter tries to shed some light on the relationship between incumbency 
and turnout using a rich data set providing information on the results of the Italian 
municipal elections over the period 1993-2011. To handle problems deriving from 
the fact that the incumbent's decision to run for re-election is endogenous and may 
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be affected by unobservable and time variant variables that also affect turnout (for 
instance, some unobservable skills of the incumbent may affect his/her decision to 
run for election and voters’ decision to cast their vote), an instrumental variable 
strategy is implemented, using as an instrument for the presence of an incumbent 
among candidates the mayor term-limit imposed by Italian law (the mayor term 
limit represents a valid instrument since it clearly affects the probability of having 
an incumbent among candidates, but it is unlikely to directly affect turnout).  
Furthermore, municipalities located in the Center-South and in the northern part 
of Italy have been separately considered, since in areas endowed by low social 
capital (such as the South of Italy) there is both a higher probability of having 
corrupt incumbents, who establish clientelistic relationships and a higher tendency 
of free riding among citizens who avoid to protest against government malfeasance 
(Knack, 2002; Peiró-Palomino and Tortosa-Ausina, 2013). Instead, in areas 
characterized by a high level of social capital, clientelistic relationships are less 
frequent, which might weaken the efforts made by the incumbent to increase turnout 
(the expected returns of winning an election are lower as they do not include the 
personal gains deriving from corruption, see Escaleras et al. 2012), while citizens 
are more likely to punish bad performing incumbents by increasing support for 
challengers, leading to an increase in turnout. These two channels work in opposite 
directions. Depending on which one prevails, the effect of incumbency on turnout 
will be positive or negative (or null since the two effects can offset each other). 
To better investigate this issue, I have analyzed the effect of incumbency on 
turnout both in relation to social capital as well as by looking separately at the 
subsample of Italian regions characterized by a high density of organized crime 
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(above the 75th percentile of the density of mafia infiltration index) and at the 
subsample of regions with relatively low density of organized crime (below the 25th 
percentile).  
The second chapter of my thesis focuses on the incumbency advantage in 
election success (see, for example, Erikson, 1971; Payne, 1981; Alford and 
Hibbing, 1981; Alford and Brady, 1988; King and Gelman, 1990; Cox and 
Morgenstern, 1993; Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2000), as knowing whether the 
incumbent has an advantage in winning the competition compared to his 
challengers has important implications on the quality of governance. In fact, 
incumbents may allocate public resources to finance their electoral campaigns, or 
have a dominant position in a committee (such as the City Council). In addition, 
some resources may be used for providing special services to citizens close to next 
elections in order to obtain a greater number of votes (Fiorina, 1976). 
The empirical literature has focused on the benefits that candidates get once they 
become incumbent, both at the state (Garand, 1991; King, 1990; Cox and 
Morgenstern, 1993) and federal level (Erikson, 1971; Alford and Hibbing, 1981; 
Alford and Brady, 1988; Gelman and King, 1990) in U.S. House elections, 
generally highlighting a personal incumbency advantage.  
The second chapter of my thesis contributes to this large existing literature in 
two ways. First of all, the literature investigating the incumbency 
advantage/disadvantage for European countries is scant, and in particular, no author 
so far has analyzed whether incumbent mayors do or do not have an advantage in 
winning the competition compared to non-incumbent candidates for Italian 
municipal elections. In fact, decisions made at municipal level have a great impact 
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on citizens’ daily lives, since these decisions often concern relevant services, such 
as the management of public utilities, the provision of public housing etc. For this 
reason, citizens are usually interested in the composition of the Municipal bodies 
and in the performance of the mayor, especially when he/she has already performed 
the same charge in the past. Second, in Italy the differences in the economic and 
social conditions of the two main geographical areas (South and North) are likely 
to matter when the incumbency effect is estimated. On the one hand, as the southern 
part of the country is poorer and endowed with a low level of social capital, the 
positive impact of the incumbency status on both share of votes as well as on the 
probability of winning the election may be related to the clientelistic relationships 
established by the incumbent candidates, which ensure political support in 
exchange of benefits (exchange votes). On the other hand, in areas characterized by 
general discontent such as the South of Italy, incumbents may have some 
difficulties in satisfying the majority of voters and as a consequence, the probability 
of winning the electoral competition for incumbent candidates is expected to be 
lower than that of incumbents holding power in the North.  
In order to identify the causal effect of incumbency status on the probability of 
winning the electoral race, and to overcome the problem of selection bias and 
omitted variable bias, a regression discontinuity design (RDD) has been 
implemented. The focus is on very close elections which are decided by a narrow 
margin of victory. The bare winners and bare losers of these elections are assumed 
to be comparable in all their baseline characteristics. This implies that bare losers 
provide a valid counterfactual for bare winners with regard to subsequent electoral 
outcomes.  
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The third chapter of my thesis examines the relationship between legislature size 
and government size, because one of the main motivations explaining the increase 
in government size over the last decades, from a supply side perspective, is related 
to the actions played by legislators who usually internalize all the benefits related 
to the implementation of a particular project to the detriment of the general 
community since taxes are spread across citizens (the so-called “Law of 1/n” 
proposed by Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen, 1981). 
However, this conjecture has been criticized by Primo and Snyder (2005) who 
theoretically show that the positive relationship between spending and legislature 
size might reverse (reverse Law of 1/n) when some factors, such as the type of good 
being provided, the costs of raising revenues, whether the local government has to 
share in the project’s cost with the central government, are taken into account.   
For this reason, studying whether legislature size positively or negatively affects 
government size is an empirical question, even though in the literature mixed results 
are found. On the one hand, some authors (see Gilligan and Matsusaka, 2001; 
Bradbury and Crain, 2001; Bradbury and Stephenson, 2003; Egger and 
Koethenbuerger, 2010; Hirota and Yunoue, 2012) highlight a positive impact of 
legislature size on government spending using US data. Furthermore, the same 
positive effect has been found by Egger and Koethenbuerger (2010) and Hirota and 
Yunoue (2012) using German and Japanese data respectively. Per-Petterson-
Lidbom (2012) instead finds a negative causal effect of legislature size on local 
government expenditures both for Finnish and Swedish municipalities. 
The contribution of the third chapter to the literature that focuses on motivations 
explaining an increase in government size is to provide new evidence on the impact 
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of legislature size on government spending in Italy at local level, using a rich data 
set on municipal budgets over the period 2001-2007. In fact, to the best of my 
knowledge this is the first empirical work studying the relationship between 
legislature size and government spending for Italian municipalities. To recover the 
causal effect of interest, an exogenous variation in legislature size induced by Italian 
law, establishing that Council size is a deterministic step function of population 
size, has been used. This law introduces a discontinuity in municipal Council size 
around some known thresholds of a continuous variable (population size), allowing 
me to implement a Sharp Regression Discontinuity Design. Further, the "Law of 
1/n" on pork barrel policies is tested, by using capital expenditures per capita as a 
proxy for the investment projects implemented at local level in Italy. Finally, 
expenditures that are more directly under control of bureaucrats, such as current 
expenditures per capita, are considered. In fact, it may happen that government 
programs do enter into force only because some interest groups want them and the 
legislature authorizes them. In other words, the government can grow not only 
because the increase in expenditure is required from citizens, interest groups, or by 
legislators, but also because they are required by bureaucrats working for the 
government. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
The Impact of Incumbency on Turnout.                            
Evidence from Italian Municipalities 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction  
While a large literature has investigated the effect of the incumbency status on the 
probability that an incumbent candidate wins the electoral competition, little is 
known on how incumbency affects turnout.  
Understanding why people vote in large elections and which factors affect this 
decision is of great interest both for political scientists and economists. The 
literature typically distinguish between “instrumental voting”, when people vote 
because they are interested in the consequences of the electoral process, and 
“expressive voting”, when people obtain an intrinsic reward from casting a vote 
(see Brennan and Brooks, 2013; Hillman, 2010; Tóka, 2009). Having an incumbent 
among candidates at the electoral race could affect turnout through a number of 
channels relating to both instrumental and expressive motivations. Firstly, the 
incumbent candidate, due to the so-called incumbency advantage (disadvantage), 
can reduce (increase) the degree of political competition (the probability of being 
the decisive voter) and, as a consequence, voters might be less (more) inclined to 
participate to the polls (see for example, Hortala-Vallve and Esteve-Volart, 2011). 
This would be an indirect effect, since the electoral turnout is influenced through 
the change that the presence of an incumbent produces on electoral competition. 
Electoral turnout may also be influenced through more direct channels. First of all, 
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maintaining constant the level of political competition, elections in which one or 
more incumbents run for re-election are typically characterized by a higher 
availability of information, since citizens had the opportunity to observe, even if 
imperfectly, past performance of incumbent candidates (Houser et al. 2011; 
Grofman et al., 1995; Keele, 2007; Sobbrio and Navarra, 2010). The increase in the 
availability of information might lead to an increase in turnout either because 
information directly increases the expected utility from voting (decision- theoretic 
models of turnout, Matsusaka, 1995) or because informed voters are less afraid of 
cancelling out with their vote an informed vote with similar preferences (game 
theoretic models, Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1999). However, offering more 
information to voters might also translate in lower political participation. Oliveros 
(2013) proposes a theoretical model of information acquisition and voting and 
shows that voters with extreme ideology collect information and vote if the 
information reinforces their bias, but abstain if the information goes against their 
bias. The empirical evidence on the relationship between information availability 
and turnout also leads to ambiguous results (see Hauser et. al. 2011; Larcinese, 
2009; Lassen, 2005) and even information on corruption does not increase in an 
obvious manner political participation; instead, a number of papers find an increase 
in abstentions, probably because voters become disenchanted with the political 
system (see for example, Costas-Pérez, 2014; Chong et al., 2013; Caillier, 2010). 
It should also be considered that incumbency may affect the direct utility which 
comes from expressing political preferences since voters may obtain higher or 
lower utility from voting in an election characterized by a different degree of 
novelty in the pool of candidates. Finally, another direct channel through which 
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incumbency can affect turnout is related to the fact that incumbent politicians are 
able to use their power and resources to obtain "exchange votes" leading, by this 
way, to an increase in political participation. This type of relationship based on the 
log-rolling usually characterizes the poorest areas of a country and could be stronger 
in the presence of an incumbent running for re-election. In fact, even if incumbent 
politicians are as likely as entrants to be corrupt, incumbents, having spent time in 
office, had the opportunity to divert public resources4 and to use “red-tape 
procedures” and private information in order to obtain exchange votes. In other 
words, even if incumbents and freshmen politicians have ex-ante the same 
characteristics, time spent in office might have favored the occurrence of corrupt 
behaviors. For instance, Coviello and Gagliarducci (2010), using Italian data, show 
that mayors’ longevity in office produces a deterioration of the procurement system, 
with a reduction in participation and an increase in the cost of the public work. In a 
similar vein, Besley and Prat (2006) find a positive correlation between political 
longevity and some cross-country measures of corruption. 
In this paper I try to shed some light on the relationship between incumbency 
and turnout. I use a rich data set providing information on the results of the Italian 
municipal elections over the period 1993-2011. To handle problems deriving from 
the fact that the incumbent's decision to run for election is endogenous and may be 
affected by unobservable and time variant variables that also affect turnout (for 
instance some unobservable skills of the incumbent may affect his\her decision to 
run for election and voters’ decision to cast their vote), I implement an instrumental 
                                                          
4 Many theoretical models predict that incumbents increase their chances of reelection through pork-
barrel spending (see for example, Keefer and Khemani 2009; Weingast et al., 1981; Bickers, et al., 
1996). For a recent empirical analysis see Stratmann (2013). 
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variable strategy. I use as an instrument for the presence of an incumbent among 
candidates the mayor term-limit imposed by Italian law (according to this law -DL 
25 March 1993, no. 81-, if the outgoing mayor has already been confirmed for two 
consecutive terms, he/she cannot run at the next election). Term limits create ideal 
conditions for instrumental variables because term limits are exogenous to all those 
factors that might affect both individual incumbents’ decision to run for reelection 
and turnout. The mayor term limit I consider represents a valid instrument since it 
clearly affects the probability of having an incumbent among candidates, but it is 
unlikely to directly affect turnout. Two-Stage-Least-Square results show a negative 
and statistically significant effect of having an incumbent among candidates on 
turnout. However, when I consider separately municipalities located in the Center-
South and in the northern part of Italy, the negative effect persists only for 
municipalities located in the North, while for the Center-South the effect is null. 
This heterogeneous behavior is confirmed, also when, in order to try to understand 
whether incumbency affects turnout through some other channels than political 
competition, I add a measure of political competition among my controls. Once I 
control for the degree of competition characterizing the electoral race, I find a 
negative, but not statistically significant effect for the North, whereas for elections 
held in the South the effect is positive and statistically significant.  
I speculate that in areas endowed by low social capital (such as the South of 
Italy) there is both a higher probability of having corrupt incumbents, who establish 
clientelistic relationships5 and a higher tendency of free riding among citizens who 
                                                          
5 Areas endowed with low social capital are characterized by relationships that often involve requests 
for jobs and patronage and citizens living in these areas may be more inclined to cast their vote in 
relation to exchange agreements. This is more likely to happen in elections in which the incumbent 
runs for re-election since he\she had the opportunity to divert public resources to gain votes. 
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avoid to protest against government malfeasance (Knack, 2002; Peiró-Palomino 
and Tortosa-Ausina, 2013). Both these channels are likely to lead to a positive 
relationship between incumbency and turnout. Instead, in areas characterized by a 
high level of social capital, clientelistic relationships are less frequent, which might 
weaken the efforts made by the incumbent to increase turnout (the expected returns 
of winning an election are lower as they do not include the personal gains deriving 
from corruption, see Escaleras et al. 2012), while citizens are more likely to punish 
bad performing incumbents by increasing support for challengers, leading to an 
increase in turnout. These two channels work in opposite directions. Depending on 
which one prevails, the effect of incumbency on turnout will be positive or negative 
(or null since the two effects can offset each other). 
To better investigate this issue I analyze the effect of incumbency in 
relationship to social capital (as measured by blood donations). I split the sample 
and look separately at provinces below the 25th and above the 75th percentile. I find 
that the positive relationship between turnout and incumbency holds true only in 
municipalities characterized by low levels of social capital. 
I have further scrutinized this question by looking separately at the subsample of 
Italian regions characterized by a high density of organized crime (above the 75th 
percentile) and at the subsample of regions with very low density of organized 
crime (below the 25th percentile). Again, I find a positive impact of incumbency on 
turnout for regions characterized by a high density of organized crime, while the 
relationship is either negative or zero, according on whether I control or not for 
political competition, for the other regions.  
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The effects I find are small (based on the largest estimates, it emerges a positive 
impact of about 0.49 percentage points in the South), but in line with those found 
in the literature on turnout. In a well-known paper, Matsusaka and Palda (1999) 
conclude that very little of the variation in voter turnout can be explained by most 
of the ‘‘standard’’ independent variables (such as age, education, electoral 
competition), leaving much of the observed variation to unobservable factors. 
I believe that understanding whether incumbency affects electoral turnout is 
relevant since turnout is often considered a crucial indicator of democracy (Sartori, 
1987; Pzeworski et al., 2000; Clark et al., 2009). From a theoretically point of view, 
having an incumbent among candidates might either increase or decrease turnout 
and then providing empirical evidence on this relationship is particularly important. 
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first work focusing of this issue and the 
heterogeneous effects I find suggest that the channels behind it might differ 
according to the social and institutional environment.  
My work is related to the literature investigating the determinants of turnout and 
more in particular to a strand of the literature analyzing the impact of candidates' 
characteristics on political participation. The idea at the basis of these works is that 
information on candidates' characteristics allows voters to make inference on 
candidates’ skills. For instance, McDermott (2005), by focusing on statewide 
elections held in California, studies the impact of the candidate occupational label 
on voters’ choice. She shows that candidate occupational clue helps voters to make 
a decision in low-information races, reducing abstention. On the same vein, Kahn 
(1993) shows that information on past political experience leads to an increase in 
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electoral participation, since voters by getting these information realize that 
candidates have already developed some specific abilities in the political sector.  
Other similar papers have investigated how turnout is affected by the presence 
of female candidates on turnout (De Paola et al. 2013; Wolf 2011; McDermott, 
1997) and by candidates' race (Sigelman et al., 1995, Washington, 2006). In fact, 
voters could obtain utility from voting for candidates of their own gender/race or 
they may consider gender/race as a proxy for candidates' quality and preferences. 
Similar channels may induce voters to change their behavior in relation to candidate 
sexual orientation (Golebiowska, 2001).  
My work is also related to the very large literature investigating the incumbency 
advantage/disadvantage. In particular, De Paola et al. (2010), using the same data I 
consider in this paper,6 show that the percentage of votes obtained by each candidate 
and the probability of being elected as a mayor at Italian municipal elections is 
positively affected by incumbency. An incumbency advantage emerges also for US 
(Butler, 2009; Ansolabehere et al. 2000), and German federal elections 
(Hainmueller and Kern, 2008). Conversely, Titiunik (2009), analyzing the 
incumbency effect for Brazilian municipal elections, finds a negative impact. 
Similar results are found by Linden (2004) and Uppal (2009) for Indian elections 
and by Miguel and Zahidi (2004) for Ghana. 
Some recent works have also considered how the incumbency 
advantage/disadvantage changes in relationship to exogenous changes in turnout, 
(see Hansford and Gomez, 2010; Trounstine, 2013), showing that higher turnout 
lowers the vote share for the candidate of the incumbent’s party. In my paper I take 
                                                          
6 More precisely, they use data on Italian municipal elections for the period 1993-2006. 
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a different perspective and look at the effect that an exogenous change in the 
probability of having an incumbent among candidates produces on turnout.  
On this ground I also contribute to the literature analyzing the relationship 
between political accountability and social capital. Ferejohn (1986), Persson and 
Tabellini (2000), Alesina and Tabellini (2008), Besley (2005) show that social 
capital can affect political outcomes through two channels. First, higher social 
capital might induce individuals to bear the cost of gathering and processing 
information about the behavior of their political representative, putting them in the 
condition to punish misbehavior. Second, social capital may play a role in inducing 
voters to refrain from rewarding corrupt or lazy politicians despite receiving some 
targeted or clientelistic benefits and induce them to vote according to aggregate 
social welfare criteria. Some evidence on these effects is provided by Nannicini et 
al. (2013) that, using Italian data on the Italian members of Parliament, show how 
the electoral punishment of political misbehavior is considerably larger in electoral 
districts with high social capital. In line with this finding, I show that when social 
capital is low, voters are also less inclined to punish incumbent politician through 
abstention. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the description of 
the institutional framework and of my data set. In Section 3, I discuss municipal 
fixed effects estimates, whereas in Section 4 I present Two Stage Least Square 
results. Section 5 concludes. 
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1.2  Institutional Setting and Data 
The system currently regulating municipal elections in Italy has been introduced in 
1993 (DL 25 March 1993, no. 81). It has established the direct election of the mayor 
and the adoption of the plurality rule, with some differences according to the size 
of the city. For municipalities with a population of fewer than 15,000 inhabitants, 
elections are held with single ballot and plurality rule: the winning candidate is 
awarded a majority premium of at least two-thirds of the seats in the council. For 
cities with a population above 15,000, elections are held using a dual ballot system 
(where the second ballot is held only if none of the candidates obtains an absolute 
majority of votes in the first ballot). Only the two leading candidates at the first 
round compete in the second ballot and the winning candidate is awarded a majority 
premium of at least 60 percent of the seats in the council. 
Since 1993, mayors have been subject to a two-term limit, while members of the 
Executive Committee and of the Municipal Council, endowed with legislative 
power, can be re-elected indefinitely. 
Municipal elections in Italy are held every 5 years7 and Municipal governments 
cannot choose the election schedule. In certain circumstances, the legislature may 
not survive until the end of its legislative term, e.g. because of a mayor’s early 
resignation. In these cases, elections are held before the natural schedule, and, as a 
consequence all subsequent elections will be held at different times from other 
municipalities that have completed the foreseen legislative term.  
Municipalities have a registry of eligible voters, which is revised whenever there 
is an election and all citizens aged 18 or above on the election date are automatically 
                                                          
7 With the exception of the years between 1993 and 1999, when the electoral mandate had a duration 
of 4 years. 
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registered to vote. Voting takes place in polling stations organized by the local 
authorities. Elections are organized according to a traditional paper ballot system.  
My empirical analysis is based on a panel data set, provided by the Italian 
Ministry of the Internal Affairs. In order to focus on elections regulated by the same 
rules, I only consider municipalities with less than 15,000 inhabitants, in which 
elections are held with single ballot and plurality rule.8 I end up with a sample 
composed by 22,629 observations for 6,499 Italian municipalities over the period 
1993-2011. For each municipal election I have information on the number of voters 
and the number of people eligible to vote. I measure Voter Turnout (%) as the ratio 
between the number of voters and the number of eligible voters. As shown in Table 
1.1, in which some descriptive statistics are reported, Italy is characterized by a 
quite high electoral turnout compared to many European countries and to US: the 
average turnout in the period 1993-2011 has been of 79.24%, with a standard 
deviation of 9.2. 
I also have information on the number of candidates who run for a mayor 
position at each election, on their gender, age, educational attainment and previous 
job (Anagrafe degli Amministratori Locali, Ministero dell’Interno).9 Using this 
information, I build a dummy variable Incumbent taking the value of 1 when among 
the candidates running for election there is the exiting mayor and zero otherwise. 
From Table 1, I can notice that in 36% of elections there is, among candidates 
running for the mayor position, a candidate that has already performed this charge 
in the previous legislature.  
                                                          
8 The results reported in this paper remain substantially unchanged if We include in my sample also 
municipalities voting under the dual ballot system (those with more than 15,000 inhabitants). Results 
are available upon request. 
9 It is possible to obtain detailed data at an individual level at the following website: 
http://amministratori.interno.it  
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According to the Italian law not all the incumbent mayors can run for election. 
Because of a term limit, mayors cannot spend more than two consecutive terms in 
office. Then, I define Binding Term Limit as a dummy variable equal to one if the 
term limit constraint is binding and equal to zero if the term limit is slack. In 19% 
of the elections, the term limit was binding and it was not possible to have the 
incumbent mayor among candidates. 
Using the information on candidates' gender I have built a dummy variable 
Female Candidate taking the value of 1 when there is at least one female candidate 
running for a mayor position. The proportion of elections in which there is at least 
a woman participating at the electoral competition is about 20% with a standard 
deviation of 0.40. I also have information on candidates’ education, the average 
Candidates’ Education of candidates is quite high (14 years of education), 
highlighting how the majority of candidates has at least obtained a high-school 
diploma.10 Finally, candidates are on average 48 years old. 
 
Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
Voter Turnout (%) 79.240 9.253 0.010 92.99 22,629 
Incumbent 0.360 0.480 0 1 22,629 
Binding Term Limit 0.190 0.392 0 1 22,629 
Candidates’ Education  14.097 2.879 5 18 22,629 
Candidates’ Age 47.778 7.976 19 84 22,629 
Female Candidate 0.204 0.403 0 1 22,629 
Electoral Margin 0.204 0.220 0 0.875 22,629 
Education of Population 6.940 0.841 0.442 12.56 22,629 
Population Size/1,000 3,379 3.213 0.033 14,966 22,629 
Employment/Population 0.240 0.136 0.006 0.846 22,629 
% Elderly People 0.203 0.067 0.043 0.643 22,629 
Center-South 0.367 0.482 0 1 22,629 
Source: Local Administrators Data set (1985-2011), Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs; Italian Census of 
Population (1991- 2001). 
 
                                                          
10 In Italy, it takes 13 years to attain a High-School Degree while 17-18 years are necessary to attain 
a College Degree. Moreover, the educational attainment of people with a PhD or a Master degree is 
always 18 years in my sample. 
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My data set allows me also to use some proxies of the degree of competition 
characterizing each electoral race. I have information on the number of votes 
obtained by each candidate and I create a variable Electoral Margin as the absolute 
difference between the number of votes obtained by the two leading candidates 
(divided by the number of eligible voters). Electoral Margin represents an inverse 
measure of expected electoral closeness and is on average equal to 0.204, with a 
maximum of 0.875 and a minimum of 0.11  
To control for municipalities’ demographic characteristics, I use the 1991 and 
2001 Italian Census of Population. Data from the 1991 census are used for elections 
held in the period 1993-1996, while data from the 2001 census are used for elections 
held after 1996. I have information on the size of resident population, the average 
level of employment, the educational attainment of the population and the 
percentage of people aged 65 or over. As shown in Table 1, the average population 
size is 3,379, the average educational attainment of population, by considering only 
people aged 6 or above, is about 7 years. Further, the fraction of employed people 
in the population is 24%, the proportion of elderly people in the population is on 
average 20%. Roughly 37% of municipalities are located in the Center-South. 
 
1.3  Incumbency Status and Voter Turnout: Municipal Fixed Effects 
Estimates 
In this Section, I analyze whether having an incumbent mayor among candidates 
affects electoral participation. Assuming that the voter's expected utility when 
                                                          
11 The value of zero characterizes few elections in which the two candidates obtained exactly the 
same number of votes. 
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voting is given by CEpIU  , where p is the probability of being the decisive 
voter, I are the benefits deriving from the election of the voter’s favorite candidate, 
E represents the utility a voter obtains from expressing political preferences or 
solidarity and C is the costs of voting, the presence of an incumbent among 
candidates changes U through the following channels: 1) affecting p, due to the so-
called incumbency advantage (disadvantage); 2) changing I through the higher 
availability of information on candidates' expected performance or through 
"exchange votes"; 3) changing E, since voters might experiment an increase or 
decrease in the direct utility they obtain from voting in an election in which 
candidates are freshmen or  incumbents.  
Since from a theoretical point of view these effects can lead either to a positive 
or to a negative impact of incumbency on turnout, it is important to investigate this 
issue empirically. At this aim, I estimate the following model by OLS with fixed 
effects at municipal level: 
[1]   𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟_𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖 + µ𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    
 
where 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟_𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑡 is a variable measuring the (%) electoral turnout (number 
of voters on number of eligible electors) in municipality I in election year t; 
 Incumbentit  is the main variable of interest and it takes a value equal to 1 if the 
mayor in the previous legislature is among candidates and zero otherwise; 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a 
vector of municipal characteristics at the time of elections, such as the population 
size, the population size squared, the average number of years of education of the 
inhabitants, the fraction of employed people in the population, the fraction of 
elderly people; 𝑍𝑖𝑡 is a vector of candidates’ characteristics, such as the average age 
and education of candidates and a dummy variable taking the value of 1 when there 
30 
 
is at least a woman among candidates; 𝑍𝑖𝑡also includes 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡  that 
measures the degree of political competition as the difference in votes (%) between 
the winner and his/her closest challenger;  φ
i
 and µt are respectively a municipal 
and an electoral year fixed effect, whereas 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the stochastic error term of the 
model. The fixed effects 𝜑𝑖 accounts for time-invariant characteristics of the 
municipality, either observable or unobservable. 
In all regressions standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are 
clustered at the municipal level to take into account the fact that the voters’ behavior 
in the same municipality may be affected by common shocks.  
In Table 1.2 I report estimates obtained when controlling for municipal fixed 
effects. In all specifications the dependent variable is voter turnout.  
In column (1), I control only for demographic characteristics, and I find a 
negative and statistically significant, at 10 percent level, correlation between 
incumbency and turnout. In particular, having a candidate who performed the 
mayor charge in the previous legislature decreases the electoral participation by 
0.11 percentage points. In column (2) I add candidates’ characteristics as control 
variables. Again I find a negative and statistically significant correlation between 
incumbency and turnout. In order to understand what drives this negative 
relationship, in column (3), I include among controls my measure of electoral 
competition, i.e. the electoral margin. I am aware that political competition is a 
“bad” control since having an incumbent among candidates might affect the degree 
of political competition. However, including this variable can be useful to 
illuminate the mechanism through which incumbency affects turnout: incumbency 
influences both turnout and political competition, but I am interested in 
understanding whether incumbency has an effect on turnout through some other 
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channels than political competition and then controlling for political competition 
provides some insight into whether this is true. I find the expected results: turnout 
is higher in closer elections.12 Once I control for electoral competition, the effect of 
Incumbentit changes sign and becomes positive and statistically significant at the 
1 percent level, suggesting that, keeping constant the level of electoral competition, 
having an incumbent among candidates induces a higher number of electors to cast 
their vote.  
 
Table 1.2: Municipal fixed effects estimates. Incumbency and Voter Turnout 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Voter Turnout 
 
Voter Turnout Voter Turnout 
VARIABLES Population 
Controls 
Population and 
Candidates' 
Controls 
Political Controls: 
Electoral Margin 
Incumbent -0.106* -0.129** 0.187*** 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.058) 
Population Size/1,000 -1.626*** -1.657*** -1.841*** 
 (0.442) (0.441) (0.419) 
Population Size^2 0.046** 0.047** 0.059*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) 
Education of Population 1.345*** 1.355*** 1.429*** 
 (0.303) (0.302) (0.299) 
Employment/Population -1.509 -1.479 -2.132* 
 (1.274) (1.275) (1.233) 
% Elderly People -6.529* -6.413* -5.687 
 (3.883) (3.874) (3.737) 
Candidates Education  0.049*** 0.030** 
  (0.015) (0.014) 
Candidates’ Age  0.014** 0.010** 
  (0.005) (0.005) 
Female Candidates  0.097 -0.106 
  (0.083) (0.079) 
Electoral Margin   -6.447*** 
   (0.209) 
Constant 81.142*** 79.790*** 81.498*** 
 (2.407) (2.437) (2.433) 
Observations 22,629 22,629 22,629 
R-squared 0.439 0.440 0.494 
Notes: The dependent variable is voter turnout (%), as measured by the number of voters on the number of 
individuals eligible to vote. I control for municipalities fixed effects and for electoral year dummies (not reported) 
in all the regressions. Standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity and clusterized at the municipality level) 
are reported in parenthesis. The symbols ***,**,* indicate that coefficients are statistically significant 
respectively at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
 
                                                          
12 These results are consistent with those found by Fauvelle-Aymar and Francois (2008) for French 
elections, by Simonovits (2012) for Hungarian elections and by De Paola and Scoppa (2011; 2013) 
for Italian municipal elections. 
32 
 
As far as my control variables (municipal and candidates’ characteristics) are 
concerned, I find the expected results (see column 3). Voter turnout increases with 
the educational attainment of the population, while it decreases with population size 
13 and the employment rate. Candidates’ characteristics also matter. Having more 
educated candidates running for the mayor position positively affects turnout, 
suggesting that electors decide to go to the polls and to cast their vote when 
candidates are considered qualified on the basis of their educational attainment. 
Further, having elderly candidates also positively affects turnout, maybe because 
older candidates are perceived as more experienced. On the other hand, having at 
least a female among candidates produces a negative but not statistically significant 
impact on turnout. 
OLS estimates presented in Table 1.2 might be biased due to endogeneity 
problems and then be the result of spurious correlation between incumbency and 
electoral participation: the incumbent's decision to run for election is endogenous 
and may be affected by unobservable and time variant variables that also affect 
turnout. In the next section I handle endogeneity problems by using an instrumental 
variable approach.  
 
1.4  Instrumental Variable Estimates 
To disentangle the causal effect of incumbency on electoral participation I use a 
Two-Stage-Least-Square (TSLS) approach, specifying the model presented in the 
previous section as follows: 
[1]      𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟_𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
 
[2]     𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚_𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡  
                                                          
13 This finding is in line with the idea that the single rational elector is not able to modify the electoral 
outcome alone and in turn, when population size increases, the expected utility deriving from casting 
the vote decreases, leading to voters’ absenteeism (see for example Mueller, 2003). 
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The coefficient β1 in equation [1] measures the effect of my variable of interest 
on electoral turnout. From equations [1] and [2] I can notice that Incumbentit 
might be positively or negatively correlated with the error term εit, leading to 
biased estimates in the municipal fixed effects model discussed in the previous 
section. For instance, some unobservable abilities of the incumbent embedded in 
the error term of equation [1], such as communicative skills or charisma, may affect 
both his/her decision to run for election and voters’ decision to cast their vote. 
To solve this endogeneity problem, I estimate a TSLS model using  
𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚_𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡it (a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the outgoing 
mayor has already been confirmed for two consecutive terms and zero otherwise) 
as an instrument for 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑡it. The Italian electoral law establishes a two 
mandate term limit and, as a consequence, while incumbent mayors at their first 
mandate can decide to run or not for re-election (about 36% of mayors at their first 
mandate decide to run for re-election), those at their second mandate are excluded 
from competition. Then, it is possible to have among candidates the outgoing mayor 
only if he/she has not already spent two consecutive terms in office; in this case the 
term limit constraint is not binding and my instrument takes the value of 0, 
otherwise the term limit is binding and the instrument takes the value of 1. This 
implies that Binding_Term_Limitit is strongly correlated to 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑡it. On the 
other hand,  Binding_Term_Limitit is exogenous because I do not expect it to 
affect, through other channels, turnout (i.e. it is not included in equation [1]) and, 
as a consequence, it is not correlated to the error term 𝜀𝑖𝑡. 
TSLS estimates are shown in Table 3. Panel B highlights the results from the 
First Stage regressions. The instrumental variable strongly determines 
Incumbentit.  
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Table 1.3: TSLS Estimates. Incumbency Effect on Voter Turnout 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Voter Turnout 
 
Voter Turnout Voter Turnout 
 Population Controls Population and 
Candidates's 
Controls 
Political Controls: 
Electoral Margin 
VARIABLES  Panel A 
TSLS 
 
Incumbent -0.309*** -0.331*** 0.029  
 (0.111) (0.113) (0.108)    
Population Size/1,000 -1.641*** -1.671*** -1.853*** 
 (0.341) (0.341) (0.324)    
Population Size^2 0.047** 0.048** 0.061*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.018)    
Education of Population 1.467*** 1.477*** 1.559*** 
 (0.166) (0.166) (0.157)    
Employment/Population -1.435 -1.405 -2.049**  
 (0.894) (0.893) (0.849)    
% Elderly People -6.189*** -6.075*** -5.364**  
 (2.296) (2.295) (2.181)    
Candidates’ Education  0.051*** 0.031**  
  (0.013) (0.013)    
Candidates’ Age  0.016*** 0.012*** 
  (0.005) (0.004)    
Female Candidates  0.087 -0.112    
  (0.082) (0.078)    
Electoral Margin   -6.406*** 
   (0.156)    
Observations 22,629 22,629 22,629 
 
 
 Panel B 
First Stage 
 
VARIABLES Incumbent Incumbent Incumbent 
Binding Term Limit -0.735*** -0.727*** -0.719*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
First Stage F-Stat 
(p-value) 
9,353.02 
(0.000) 
9,215.96 
(0.000) 
9,055.40 
(0.000) 
Adj- R squared 0.54 0.55 0.55 
Notes: The dependent variable is voter turnout (%), as measured by the number of voters on the number of 
individuals eligible to vote. I control for municipalities fixed effects and for electoral year dummies (not 
reported) in all the regressions. Standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity and clusterized at the 
municipality level) are reported in parenthesis. The symbols ***,**,* indicate that coefficients are 
statistically significant respectively at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
 
 
Panel A of Table 1.3 reports the TSLS estimates for the same specifications 
reported in Table 2. In column (1) and (2), in which I control for municipal and 
candidates' characteristics respectively, I find that incumbency produces a negative 
and highly statistically significant effect on voter turnout. In particular, having a 
candidate who held a mayor position in the previous legislature decreases electoral 
participation by 0.31 percentage points (see column (1)). Similar results are found 
in column (2) where I add candidates’ characteristics. 
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As in OLS estimates, once I control for political competition (see columns (3)), 
the effect of incumbency on turnout becomes positive. Nevertheless, in TSLS 
estimates the effect is no longer statistically significant suggesting that once I 
handle endogeneity issues and control for the indirect effect that incumbency 
produces on turnout through the change in electoral competition, no other additional 
effect is left.  
It is worthwhile to notice that the estimated effect is a Local Average Treatment 
Effect (LATE) (i identify the average treatment effect for that part of the population 
that changes its participation behavior with the change in the instrument). Since my 
instrument only affects the subgroup of mayors that are elected in their second 
period, I measure a local average treatment effect among elections in which the 
term limit was binding. My instrument affects about 20% of elections in my sample. 
Then, the local average treatment effect is computed within a not too small group 
of municipalities. This group is instead peculiar. However, it is not clear how this 
might affect the direction of the LATE compared to the ATE, since in the 
municipalities affected by the instrument, voters might be either more or less 
inclined to vote. In my data the turnout rate is slightly smaller (78%) in those 
municipalities where the instrument is binding - no incumbent because of a binding 
term limit- compared to those municipalities where the instrument is not binding 
(80%) – no incumbent but no binding term limit), which might point to a local 
average treatment effect that is smaller than the ATE.   
The channels through which incumbency may affect turnout may work 
dissimilarly in different parts of Italy. I are indeed considering a country that is very 
heterogeneous in terms of economic and social conditions, with the northern part 
being richer and endowed with higher social capital compared to the South. To 
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investigate whether the relationship between incumbency and turnout is 
heterogeneous in the two parts of the country I have run separate regressions14 for 
municipalities located in the Center-South and in the North of Italy.  
 
Table 1.4: TSLS Estimates. Incumbency Effect on Voter Turnout: North vs South 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Voter 
Turnout 
 
Voter 
Turnout 
Voter 
Turnout 
Voter 
Turnout 
Voter 
Turnout 
Voter 
Turnout 
 Center-
South 
North Full 
Sample 
Center-
South 
North Full 
Sample 
VARIABLES   Panel A 
TSLS 
   
Incumbent -0.009 -0.462*** -0.462*** 0.354* -0.073 -0.073 
 (0.196) (0.120) (0.130) (0.184) (0.125) (0.130) 
Incumbent*South   0.454**   0.424** 
   (0.217)   (0.215) 
Population/1,000 1.105* -1.575*** -1.607*** 0.913 -1.888*** -1.969*** 
 (0.624) (0.362) (0.392) (0.586) (0.379) (0.394) 
Population Size^2 -0.065* 0.028 0.029 -0.052* 0.047** 0.051** 
 (0.034) (0.020) (0.022) (0.032) (0.021) (0.022) 
Education of Population -0.465* 0.076 0.158 -0.339 0.095 -0.056 
 (0.269) (0.194) (0.207) (0.255) (0.221) (0.204) 
Employment/Population 6.152*** -1.153 -1.122 5.331*** -1.521* -1.563 
 (1.782) (0.897) (0.974) (1.675) (0.912) (0.954) 
% Elderly People -46.348*** -5.598** -5.707** -47.816*** -2.879 -3.511 
 (4.333) (2.419) (2.626) (4.072) (2.498) (2.502) 
Candidates’ Education 0.096*** 0.030** 0.031** 0.059** 0.020 0.019 
 (0.025) (0.014) (0.015) (0.024) (0.014) (0.015) 
Candidates’s Age 0.020** 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.009* 0.008* 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) 
Female Candidates 0.019 0.204** 0.204** -0.095 -0.043 -0.043 
 (0.159) (0.083) (0.090) (0.150) (0.085) (0.089) 
Electoral Margin    -8.317*** -5.744*** -5.744*** 
    (0.297) (0.170) (0.178) 
Observations       
 8,316 14,309 22,629 8,316 14,309 22,629 
 
   Panel B 
First Stage 
VARIABLES Incumbent Incumbent Incumbent Incumbent Incumbent Incumbent 
Binding Term Limit -0.703*** -0.739*** -0.739*** -0.700*** -0.730*** -0.730*** 
 
Binding Terrm 
Limit*South 
(0.013) (0.009) (0.009) 
0.036** 
(0.015) 
(0.013) (0.009) (0.009) 
0.029** 
(0.015) 
First Stage F-Stat 
(p-value) 
3,070.27 
(0.000) 
6,115.24 
(0.000) 
4,230.70 
(0.000) 
3,037.11 
(0.000) 
5,981.47 
(0.000) 
4,183.54 
(0.000) 
Adj- R squared 0.51 0.57 0.55 0.51 0.57 0.55 
Notes: The dependent variable is voter turnout (%), as measured by the number of voters on the number of 
individuals eligible to vote. I control for municipalities fixed effects and for electoral year dummies (not reported) 
in all the regressions. Standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity and clusterized at the municipality level) are 
reported in parenthesis. The symbols ***,**,* indicate that coefficients are statistically significant respectively at 
the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
                                                          
14 The regressions are the same as that reported in column (4) of Table 3, in which We consider the 
full set of controls. 
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Results are reported in Table 1.4. As shown in columns (1) and (2), in which I 
do not control for electoral competition, it emerges a negative and statistically 
significant effect, at the 1 percent level, for the North (column 2), while the effect 
is null for the Center-South (column 1). In column (3) to investigate whether the 
North-South differences are statistically significant, I have estimated my model 
using the whole sample and adding interaction terms between my explanatory 
variables and the dummy South. The interaction term Incumbent*South is positive 
and statistically significant: while in the North having an incumbent among 
politicians reduces turnout (by 0.462 percentage points) in the Center-South the 
effect is zero.15  
In columns (4) and (5) I again run separate regressions for municipalities located 
in the Center-South and in the North of Italy, but I add among controls my measure 
of political competition (electoral closeness). Once I control for electoral 
competition, I find a positive effect of incumbency on turnout for southern 
municipalities (incumbency increases turnout by 0.424 percentage points) and a 
negative effect (even if statistically not significant) for northern municipalities. As 
shown in column (6) the difference between the estimated treatment effect is 
statistically significant. 
A positive impact of incumbency on turnout could be related to the improvement 
in the information available to voters on candidates' expected performance. 
                                                          
15 We are interacting the variable of main interest with a dummy taking the value of one for 
municipalities located in the South. Since people can move across municipalities living in the South 
is not exogenous and it might be affected by unobservable variables that also affect turnout. In other 
words, my moderating variable might not be exogenous. However We are including fixed effects at 
municipal level. Unless the decision to live in the South is affected by time variant variables that 
also affect turnout, my results should not particularly suffer from the potential endogeneity of my 
moderator term. 
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However, I would expect this channel to work also in the northern part of the 
country. Then, I speculate that the heterogenous effect of incumbency in the two 
geographical regions is related to difference in social capital and in clientelistic 
relationship established by incumbent politicians. In areas endowed by low social 
capital there is both a higher probability of having corrupt incumbents, who 
establish clientelistic relationships and a higher tendency of free riding among 
citizens who avoid to protest against government malfeasance.16 Both these 
channels are likely to lead to a positive relationship between incumbency and 
turnout. Instead, in areas characterized by a high level of social capital, clientelistic 
relationships are less frequent, which might weaken the efforts made by candidates 
to increase turnout (the expected returns of winning an election are lower as they 
do not include the personal gains deriving from corruption, see Escaleras et al. 
2012), while citizens are more likely to punish bad performing incumbents by 
increasing support for challengers, leading to an increase in turnout. These two 
channels work in opposite directions. Depending on which one prevails, the effect 
of incumbency on turnout will be positive or negative (or null since the two effects 
can offset each other). 
 
 
                                                          
16 Clientelistic relationships are more likely to emerge in the South. As argued by Putman (1993), 
the emergence of "exchange votes" is more likely in areas characterized by poor economic 
conditions and weak social capital. In these areas contracts with government officials tend to 
overwhelmingly involve requests for jobs and patronage. In addition, even if problems related to 
clientelism and corruption at local level are mitigated by the fact that citizens are able to monitor 
better than a distant central authority, when social capital is low, citizens tend to free ride avoiding 
to protest against government malfeasance and public officials can easily indulge in inefficient 
policies aimed at increasing electoral support (see Jimenez and Sawada, 1999; Mookherjee, 2001; 
Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2005). See also Del Monte, Papagni (2007) who, using data from Italian 
regions, show that social capital is negatively correlated to corruption. 
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Table 1.5: TSLS Estimates. Incumbency Effect on Voter Turnout According to the Social 
Capital Distribution (blood donations) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Voter 
Turnout 
Voter 
Turnout 
Voter 
Turnout 
Voter 
Turnout 
Voter 
Turnout 
Voter 
Turnout 
 < 25th < 25th > 25th & 
<75th 
> 25th & 
<75th 
>75th >75th 
VARIABLES   Panel A 
TSLS 
   
Incumbent 0.064 0.422* -0.389** -0.024 -0.477*** -0.108 
 (0.228) (0.219) (0.172) (0.163) (0.179) (0.174) 
Political competition NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Observations 5,772 5,772 10,954 10,954 5,903 5,903 
                        
 Panel B 
 First Stage 
VARIABLES Incumbent Incumbent Incumbent Incumbent Incumbent Incumbent 
Binding Term Limit -0.713*** -0.708*** -0.718*** -0.712*** -0.756*** -0.747*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) 
First Stage F-Stat 
(p-value) 
2,222.24 
(0.000) 
2,186.49 
(0.000) 
4,223.70 
(0.000) 
4,161.54 
(0.000) 
2,764.65 
(0.000) 
2,690.49 
(0.000) 
Adj- R squared 0.53 0.53 0.54 0.56 0.56 0.56 
Notes: The dependent variable is voter turnout (%), as measured by the number of voters on the number of 
individuals eligible to vote. I control for municipalities fixed effects, demographic characteristics, candidates’ 
characteristics and electoral year dummies  
(not reported) in all the regressions. Standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity and clusterized at the 
municipality level) are reported in parenthesis. The symbols ***,**,* indicate that coefficients are statistically 
significant respectively at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
 
The main difference in social capital endowment in Italy is between North and 
South. However, there are also differences within each area. I consider as a measure 
of social capital blood donation17 and split the sample considering separately 
municipalities belonging to the first quartile (below the 25th percentile), 
municipalities between the 25th percentile and the 75th percentile and municipalities 
above the third quartile (above the 75th percentile). Results are reported in Table 1.5 
(i do not report control variables to save space). In odd columns I do not control for 
political competition, while in even columns I add among regressors the electoral 
margin. As shown in columns (1) and (2), I find a zero or a positive and statistically 
significant effect (according on whether I control or not for political competition) 
of incumbency on turnout for municipalities belonging to the provinces below the 
                                                          
17 The number of blood bags (each bag contains 16 ounces of blood) per million inhabitants in each 
province collected by AVIS. 
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25th percentile of the blood donation distribution. Instead, for the other 
municipalities the effect is negative and statistically significant when I do not 
control for political competition (see columns 3 and 4) and becomes not statistically 
significant when I add among controls the electoral margin (columns 5 and 6)18.   
I have further investigated this issue by looking separately at the subsample of 
Italian regions characterized by a high density of organized crime19 (above the 75th 
percentile - Sicily, Calabria, Campania, Apulia and Lazio-) and at the subsample of 
regions with very low density of organized crime (below the 25th percentile - 
Marche, Valle D'Aosta, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Veneto, Trentino Alto Adige, Molise 
-). Again I find a positive impact of incumbency on turnout for regions 
characterized by a high density of organized crime, while for the other regions the 
relationship is either negative, when I do not control for electoral competition, or 
vanishes when I add among controls a measure of electoral closeness.  
I take these results as suggestive of the fact that in municipalities characterized 
by very low levels of social capital and by high density of organized crime, 
incumbent politicians use their power and resources to establish clienteles and to 
offer benefits of different kind in exchange of electoral support. I cannot exclude 
other channels, such as the electors' desire to punish incumbent politicians, who 
may have poorly performed in low social capital areas, and to vote in favor of a new 
candidate. However, in this case I would also expect a smaller incumbency 
                                                          
18 The same results are found when We measure social capital using the indicators based on trust 
(World Value Social Survey, at the regional level). Results not reported and available upon request). 
19 Data on crime, available in Italy, are often spoiled by underreporting issues. This is a serious 
concern for my purposes, since underreporting is typically negatively related to social capital. For 
this reason, I have decided to use data at regional level and to look at one extreme to regions that, 
according to many studies (see for example Pinotti, 2011, Daniele and Marani, 2011), are 
characterized by a high density of organized crime and to the other extreme to regions where 
organized crime is very low. The data I use are from Centro Transcrime, Catholic University, Milan 
(reported in http://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indice_di_penetrazione_mafiosa). 
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advantage in areas endowed with lower social capital. To get some evidence on this 
issue I have used my data to analyze whether the incumbency advantage is related 
to social capital. At this aim I have regressed the percentage of votes obtained by 
each candidate on whether a candidate is an incumbent (controlling for gender, age 
and education differences among opponents, municipal fixed effects and municipal 
characteristics).20 I find that the incumbency advantage diminishes with social 
capital (results not reported and available upon request). This evidence, even if only 
suggestive (as I am not handling endogeneity problems arising in this type of 
estimates), supports the idea that the positive relationship between turnout and 
incumbency in municipalities characterized by low social capital is the result of 
patronage practices. 
 
Table 1.6: TSLS Estimates. Incumbency Effect on Voter Turnout According to the Level of 
Organized Crime 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Voter  
Turnout 
 
High 
Density 
Voter 
Turnout 
 
High 
Density 
Voter 
Turnout 
 
Middle 
Density 
Voter 
Turnout 
 
Middle 
Density 
Voter 
Turnout 
 
Low  
Density 
Voter 
Turnout 
 
Low  
Density 
VARIABLES   Panel A 
TSLS 
   
Incumbent 0.167 0.422** -0.412*** -0.024 -0.570** -0.066 
 (0.219) (0.208) (0.150) (0.145) (0.242) (0.225) 
Political competition NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Observations 5313 5313 13135 13135 4181 4181 
                        Panel B 
                First Stage 
VARIABLES Incumbent Incumbent Incumbent Incumbent Incumbent Incumbent 
Binding Term Limit -0.707*** -0.705*** -0.723*** -0.715*** -0.762*** -0.752*** 
 (0.016  ) (0.017) (0.010) (0.010) (0.018) (0.018) 
First Stage F-Stat 
(p-value) 
1471.86  
(0.000) 
1454.09 
(0.000) 
3526.95 
(0.000) 
3481.47 
(0.000) 
1478.90 
(0.000) 
1248.89 
(0.000) 
Adj- R squared 0.43 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.45 0.45 
Notes: The dependent variable is voter turnout (%), as measured by the number of voters on the number of 
individuals eligible to vote. I control for municipalities fixed effects, demographic characteristics, candidates’ 
characteristics and electoral year dummies (not reported) in all the regressions. Standard errors (corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and clusterized at the municipality level) are reported in parenthesis. The symbols ***,**,* 
indicate that coefficients are statistically significant respectively at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
  
                                                          
20 To make easier the interpretation of results, I restrict my analysis to only those elections in which 
two candidates compete. 
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1.5  Concluding Remarks 
Having an incumbent among candidates at the electoral race can affect turnout 
through both indirect and direct channels. The incumbent candidate, due to the 
incumbency advantage (disadvantage), can reduce (increase) the degree of political 
competition and, as a consequence, voters might be less (more) inclined to 
participate to the polls. In addition, since elections in which one or more incumbents 
run for re-election are typically characterized by a higher availability of 
information, electors may take advantage of this information and be inclined to 
express their vote (Grofman et al., 1995; Keele, 2007). Moreover, another direct 
channel through which incumbency can affect turnout is related to the fact that 
incumbent politicians are able to use their power and resources to obtain "exchange 
votes" leading, by this way, to an increase in political participation. This type of 
relationship based on the log-rolling usually characterizes the poorest areas of a 
country and could be stronger in the presence of an incumbent running for re-
election. 
In this paper, by using data on electoral results of Italian municipal elections 
over the period 1993-2011, I have tried to shed some light on these effects. I have 
firstly estimated an OLS model. Controlling for municipal fixed effect and a 
number of municipal and candidates' characteristics, I find that having a candidate 
who performed the mayor charge in the previous legislature produces a negative 
effect on turnout. However, once I control for the degree of political competition at 
the electoral race the effect of incumbency on turnout changes sign and becomes 
positive and statistically significant, suggesting that, keeping constant the level of 
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electoral competition, having an incumbent among candidates induces a higher 
number of electors to cast their vote.  
To handle endogeneity problems arising from the fact that the incumbent 
decision to run for re-election may be affected by unobservable and time variant 
variables that also affect turnout, I have used an instrumental variable approach, 
instrumenting the incumbency status with the mayor term-limit, imposed by the 
Italian law. This instrument is strongly correlated to the presence of the incumbent 
mayor among candidates and should not directly affect turnout. 
TSLS estimation results confirm OLS estimates and show a negative and 
statistically significant effect of incumbency on electoral participation. This effect 
is again driven by the reduction that incumbency produces on electoral competition. 
When I control for the "closeness" of the electoral race, I find a positive but (in 
contrast to OLS estimates) not statistically significant effect. There is also evidence, 
however, that the impact of incumbency is heterogeneous across geographical 
areas. When I distinguish between municipalities located in the North and in the 
Center-South of Italy, by controlling for the degree of political competition, I find 
that incumbency does not affect turnout in northern municipalities, but it produces 
a positive and statistically significant effect in the South. I argue that this 
heterogeneity is likely to be related to differences in social capital and in 
clientelistic relationships established by incumbent politicians. My conjecture finds 
support when I look separately at municipalities in the lower and upper quartile of 
the social capital distribution and at municipalities characterized by high or low 
density of organized crime. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Incumbency Advantage at Municipal Elections in Italy:   
A Quasi-Experimental Approach 
 
 
 
 
2.1  Introduction 
A growing body of literature emphasizes the crucial role played by political 
institutions in the process of economic development and in particular, how the 
distribution of political power21 improves economic performance and determines 
the allocation of resources, even in a democracy (Acemoglu, 2002). According to 
the fiscal common theory (Tullock, 1959; Buchanan and Tullock, 1962), politicians 
once elected, in order to obtain a greater electoral support, try to use their influence 
to redirect resources to particular groups of constituents to the detriment of the 
general community. The fact that holding political power makes such a difference 
is the reason that democratic governments are founded on the principle that voters 
should ultimately decide which representatives are chosen to wield power22 (Pande, 
2003). 
                                                          
21 The political power is defined as an authority held by a group within a society that allows for 
the administration of public resources and implements policies for the society. Distribution of power 
is in balance when each decision is made by the group of individuals (politicians and citizens) 
affected by the consequences of the decision per se. Acemoglu (2002) shows that inefficient 
institutions and policies are chosen because they serve the interests of politicians or social groups 
that hold political power at the expense of the rest. Related to this argument, Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2000b, 2002) explain why rulers who fear replacement may pursue the wrong policies 
for the society. In that paper, rulers who fear replacement are more likely to resist the introduction 
of superior technologies or institutions when these changes may erode their incumbency advantage 
and their potential future political power. 
22 Further, since long tenure in public office leads to abuse of power, legislators in many democracies 
are subject to a term limit. 
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The major risk in a democracy is that elected officials will become entrenched 
or that running for office may simply become too expensive for fresh-candidates. 
By the nature of the democratic system, being incumbent is intrinsically 
advantageous since he/she is given access to resources and decision processes that 
non-incumbent challengers do not have. If elected officials are able to use their 
political influence to remain in power, voters will have a limited influence on their 
policy decisions (Linden, 2004), especially where incentives to engage in rent 
extraction usually run high (Titiunik, 2011). Moreover, stronger incumbents also 
raise the cost of entering politics and reduce the degree of political competition 
because new challengers might not have enough resources to overcome the 
advantage of incumbency and as a consequence, voters might be less inclined to 
participate at the polls.  
For this reason, a large literature has investigated the effect of the incumbency 
status on the probability that an incumbent candidate wins the electoral competition 
both at the state (Garand, 1991; King, 1990; Cox and Morgenstern, 1993) and 
federal level (Erikson, 1971; Alford and Hibbing, 1981; Alford and Brady, 1988; 
Gelman and King, 1990) in U.S. House elections. Results generally show a 
personal incumbency advantage, defined as the votes gained by a candidate once 
he/she becomes an incumbent from constituency service, name recognition, and the 
like, in terms of winning the electoral competition. 
Moreover, some authors have focused on the incumbency effect at national and 
state elections in developing democracies, since the likelihood to observe both 
entrenched politicians controlling the political process as well as rampant 
corruption is higher (Linden, 2004). However, the evidence from some developing 
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countries, such as India (Linden, 2004; Uppal, 2009), Latin America and Caribbean 
countries (Molina, 2001)23, suggests that there is a disadvantage to incumbents. The 
only exception is Miguel and Zaidi’s (2003) investigation of national elections in 
Ghana in which they find no significant incumbency effect at the parliamentary seat 
level24. 
Furthermore, related to this argument, a second strand of literature, following 
Lee (2008)’s work, has concentrated on the partisan incumbency effect, i.e. the 
electoral benefit a candidate receives purely because his/her party is the incumbent 
party, regardless of whether he/she previously served (Fowler and Hall, 2012), 
highlighting again mixed results. In fact, Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) and 
Hainmueller and Kern (2008) find that the partisan incumbency status positively 
affects the probability of re-election and the likelihood of winning the competition 
in the US and in German districts at federal elections respectively. Conversely, 
Titiunik (2011), by using the same methodology as Lee (2008), analyses the 
incumbency effect for three different political parties at Brazilian municipal 
elections held in 2000 and finds a negative effect of the partisan incumbency both 
on the incumbent parties’ votes share as well as on their probability of winning the 
competition. 
                                                          
23 Molina (2001) argues that incumbent turnover is much higher in Latin American and Caribbean 
countries than many industrialized countries owing to endemic popular discontent over persistent 
deprivation. Conversely, for Indian national elections the incumbency disadvantage, especially after 
1991, is essentially due to a change in the political structure that leads to a system in which as 
politicians gained more experience and influence they become more likely to pursue activities that 
are not in the best interest of voters (Linden, 2004). 
24 Miguel and Zaidi (2003) justify their results saying that the lack of a meaningful incumbency 
advantage is consistent with a political system where the ruling party does not have adequate 
mechanisms at its disposal to accurately target funds down to the level of parliamentary seats. 
However, they acknowledge some important limitations of their data set, including the small sample 
size which leads to statistically imprecise estimates. 
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In this paper I provide new evidence of the incumbency effect on a candidate’s 
electoral prospects, using a large data set on Italian municipal elections held from 
1993 to 2011. Although many papers have focused on state and federal elections, 
maybe because politicians and voters attach a greater degree of importance and 
weight to national than to local elections arguing that local elections rarely make 
much difference in political life (Koryakov and Sisk, 2003) I study the personal 
incumbency advantage at municipal elections since they have certain distinct 
characteristics as compared with national elections which give them considerable 
significance in political life. First, local elections are important for their role in a 
broader national democracy, since their results are indicative of broader political 
trends and provide important information about the preferences, concerns and 
attitudes of the electorate. Second, issues in local elections are those that directly 
affect the daily lives of citizens: the nature of the competition between candidates 
and the issues that arise can be important indicators of what voters care deeply about 
and want the local authorities to tackle.  
As far as the methodology implemented to recover the causal incumbency effect 
is concerned, the main difficulty in empirically estimating incumbency 
advantage/disadvantage is omitted variable bias, since some candidate’s 
characteristics such as charisma, charm and intelligence are typically unobservable 
and unquantifiable (Levitt, 1994). If higher quality candidates attract more votes, 
electoral selection will lead to incumbents and challengers possessing different 
characteristics. Failure to control for these differences may lead to biased estimates 
of incumbency advantage (Gelman and King, 1990). In order to overcome the 
problem of selection bias and omitted variable bias, I implement a regression 
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discontinuity design (RDD). I focus on very close elections which are decided by a 
narrow margin of victory. The bare winners and bare losers of these elections are 
assumed to be comparable in all their baseline characteristics (I discuss this 
assumption in Sub-Section 2.3.1). This implies that bare losers provide a valid 
counterfactual for bare winners with regard to subsequent electoral outcomes. By 
comparing these outcomes I identify the causal effect of the incumbency status. 
The contribution of my paper is twofold. Firstly, the literature investigating the 
incumbency advantage/disadvantage for European countries is scant, and in 
particular, no author so far has analyzed whether incumbent mayors have or do not 
have an advantage in winning the competition compared to non-incumbent 
candidates for Italian municipal elections. In fact, decisions made at municipal level 
in Italy have a great impact on citizens’ daily lives, since these decisions often 
concern relevant services, such as the management of public utilities, the provision 
of public housing etc. For this reason, citizens are usually interested in the 
composition of the Municipal bodies and in the performance of the mayor, 
especially when he/she has already performed the same charge in the past. In 
particular, my Sharp Regression Discontinuity estimates show that the personal 
incumbency effect, after controlling both for candidates and municipalities’ 
characteristics as well as for partisanship and partisan incumbency, is about 33.5 
percentage points, implying that incumbents (bare winners) are more likely to win 
the competition compared to their challengers (bare losers). Similar results are 
found when I use as dependent variable the vote share at time t (the personal 
incumbency effect is roughly 17 percentage points)25, after controlling for 
                                                          
25 Results not displayed, but available upon request. 
49 
 
municipalities and candidates’ characteristics. Moreover, my findings are in line 
with those found in the literature (see for instance Alford and Brady, 1988; Gelman 
and King, 1990), although the methodology used in the previous papers does not 
take into account potential omitted variable bias. However, the effect I find is larger 
in terms of magnitude, maybe because I focus my analysis on local elections where 
the incumbency status explains most of the variation in the probability of winning 
the electoral competition compared to federal or national elections. To the best of 
my knowledge, the only authors using the Regression Discontinuity Design to find 
the causal effect of the personal incumbency status on the probability of winning 
the electoral competition are Uppal (2009) who finds an incumbency disadvantage 
of 22 percentage points over the probability of winning at time t after 1991 at Indian 
state elections, and Trounstine (2011) who highlights an incumbency advantage of 
32 percentage points at city council elections between 1915 and 1985 in fmy U.S. 
cities.26 
Secondly, I study the personal incumbency effect by taking into account the 
differences in the economic and social conditions of the two main geographical 
areas (South and North) in Italy. On the one hand, as the southern part of the country 
is poorer and endowed with a low level of social capital, the positive impact of the 
incumbency status on both the votes share as well as on the probability of winning 
the election may be related to the clientelistic relationships established by the 
incumbent candidates, which ensure political support in exchange of benefits 
(exchange votes). Areas endowed with low social capital are characterized by 
                                                          
26 As recognised by the author, these fmy cities (Austin, Dallas, San Antonio and San Jose) are not 
a representative sample of U.S. cities. Therefore, the conclusion of this paper may be limited by the 
sample used. Moreover, she does not have enough observations to separately analyze mayoral 
elections. 
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relationships that often involve requests for jobs and patronage, and citizens living 
in these areas may be more inclined to cast their vote in relation to exchange 
agreements (Knack, 2002). On the other hand, in areas characterized by general 
discontent as the South of Italy, incumbents may have some difficulties in satisfying 
the majority of voters and as a consequence, the probability of winning the electoral 
competition for incumbent candidates is expected to be lower than that of 
incumbents holding power in the North. My findings are in line with these 
explanations since bare winners are 41.6 percentage points more likely to win the 
competition compared to bare losers in the North, whereas for southern 
municipalities I find an incumbent advantage of 26.3 percentage points. 
Finally, my results are robust to different specifications of my main equation. In 
particular, my findings are similar when I consider only observations in narrow 
neighborhoods around the discontinuity point (5 and 2 percent above and below the 
threshold of margin of victory of zero respectively), and when I choose different 
polynomials of the forcing variable (Local Linear Regression) along with the 
interaction terms between polynomials of the electoral margin (until the third-order) 
and the treatment. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 is devoted to the methodology 
implemented. In Section 2.3 I describe the institutional framework, my data set and 
I check the validity of the RDD. In Section 2.4, I discuss my main results estimates, 
whereas in Section 2.5 I present some robustness checks. Section 2.6 concludes. 
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2.2  Previous Measures of Incumbency Advantage and Methodology 
 
2.2.1 How to Measure the Personal Incumbency Advantage 
 
Erikson (1971) is the first author who studies the incumbency advantage 
systematically. He compares the vote share of an individual politician running for 
the second time with the politician’s vote share in the first successful election, by 
taking into account reciprocal causation, the partisanship and other factors affecting 
the incumbency status. However, he uses a “regression on residuals” procedure that 
is quite biased in general (see King, 1986).  
An alternative measure is proposed by Garand and Gross (1984) who use the 
difference in the vote margin between incumbent winners and non-incumbent 
winners. Nevertheless, as suggested by Jacobson (1987) and Alford and Brady 
(1988), the estimates are seriously affected by selection bias because of the 
complete exclusion of incumbent losers. In fact, they overestimate the incumbency 
advantage since their measure attributes party strength in a district to the 
incumbency (Gelman and King, 1990).  
A second strand of literature uses the “sophomore surge” and “retirement slump” 
to estimate the incumbency effect. The sophomore surge is the average vote gain 
enjoyed by freshman candidates running as incumbents for the first time and the 
retirement slump is the average falloff in the party’s vote when the incumbent 
retires (Cover and Mayhew, 1977). In addition, Alford and Brady (1988) introduce 
a measure of the incumbency advantage, called “slurge” that is the average between 
the sophomore surge and the retirement slump. The intuition behind this measure 
is that, since sophomore surge underestimates - retirement slump overestimates - 
the incumbency effect, the average of the two might be a better estimate than the 
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two measures alone. However, the two effects cancel out only if the true 
incumbency advantage is zero, and it has been shown (Gelman and King, 1990) that 
“slurge” generally underestimates the incumbency advantage. 
Finally, several variants of sophomore surge and retirement slump also exist. For 
instance, Payne (1981), calculating scores separately for the Democrats and 
Republicans and then averaging them, finds biased estimates if the incumbency 
advantage is the same for both parties. Alford and Hibbing (1981) compute 
sophomore surge and retirement slump for the second and third reelections instead 
of the first only, to provide useful information about electoral career paths. 
Nevertheless, this procedure is still biased for the same reasons as the standard 
sophomore surge and retirement slump measures are biased (Gelman and King, 
1990). 
All the previous research is plagued by problems of the identification of the 
incumbency causal effect. The main issue is that the incumbency effect, based on 
the differential outcomes of incumbents and non-incumbents, suffers from a 
selection bias problem, since only those candidates who are better in quality may 
win and become incumbents. As a result, incumbency status of a candidate is not 
randomly assigned and in turn, the effect that previous authors have attributed to 
incumbency might include the effect of intrinsic differences in candidate 
characteristics (Uppal, 2009). 
In order to handle this kind of selection bias issue, I follow Uppal (2009) using 
a regression discontinuity design (RDD henceforth) that approximates a natural 
experiment and, under certain continuity conditions27, achieves a random 
                                                          
27 As shown by Lee and Lemieux (2009), only if all observable and unobservable covariates, except 
treatment, are distributed continuously around the threshold, I can assume to have valid 
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assignment of incumbency status (Lee, 2008). The peculiarity of the RDD comes 
from the fact that the treatment assignment mechanism is known (since the 
incumbency status is a deterministic function of the margin of victory at time t-1). 
Under weak smoothness assumptions (see Rubin, 1974; Hahn et al., 2000 for a 
rigorous discussion), the RDD allows me to estimate the average treatment effect 
(ATE) at the discontinuity of the covariate (margin of victory) that determines 
treatment assignment. Even under non-random selection into treatment, the RD 
design yields an unbiased estimate of the treatment effect. This is the case because 
the margin of victory is a function of observed vote shares. Observed vote shares in 
turn consist of a latent systematic component that incumbents can influence, but 
also a random component over which incumbents cannot exert control 
(Hainmueller and Kern, 2008). It can be proven that as long as the covariate that 
determines assignment to treatment includes such a random component with a 
continuous density, treatment status is randomized at the threshold (Lee, 2008). 
Therefore, at the threshold, all observed and unobserved covariates will be 
independent of treatment assignment.  
It is important at least to briefly consider the conditions under which the 
assumption of local random assignment at the threshold could be wrong. Local 
random assignment critically hinges on the presence of the random component. 
This does not imply that each municipal race has to be decided by this random 
component; in most races the random component will not be decisive. The key idea 
is that as races become closer and closer, confounders cease to systematically affect 
treatment assignment. In the limit, i.e. at the threshold, treatment assignment should 
be independent of all confounding variables. The plausibility of this assumption is 
                                                          
counterfactual observations on either side. If observations just right from the required cutoff are 
systematically different from the ones just to the left, then identification fails. 
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a function of the degree to which candidates are able to sort around the threshold. 
For example, if candidates had perfect control over their observed vote shares or 
were able to perfectly predict them, they would never run if they knew that they 
would lose. Alternatively, they would just invest enough effort to get exactly one 
more vote than the strongest district opponent. Such behavior would violate my 
identifying assumption. However, given the randomness inherent in elections, such 
a scenario seems rather implausible (Matsusaka and Palda, 1999).  
Finally, just as in a randomized experiment, treatment effects will not be 
confounded by omitted variables. This provides an important advantage over 
commonly used regression models which are by construction vulnerable to omitted 
variable bias. 
 
2.2.2 Methodology 
The ideal natural experiment for estimating the incumbency effect would require to 
observe both a candidate as an incumbent and a non-incumbent at the same point 
of time which, obviously, is not possible (Uppal, 2009). The minimum requirement 
to estimate the casual effect of the incumbency status on the probability of winning 
the electoral competition would be to have candidates randomly assigned as 
incumbents and non-incumbents. This is not likely to be true because incumbents 
usually win the competition thanks to some intrinsic characteristics that are not 
possessed by non-incumbents. 
The main identification strategy in the RDD is that incumbency status changes 
discontinuously at the threshold of margin of victory of zero. Candidates who have 
a positive margin of victory become incumbents and those who have a negative 
margin of victory become non-incumbents. In particular, the RDD compares barely 
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winners, i.e. candidates who are just above this threshold with barely losers, i.e. 
candidates just below the threshold. The intuition is that such candidates are, on 
average, similar in all observable and unobservable characteristics, and differ only 
in their incumbency status, implying that the assignment of incumbency status is 
approximately random in the neighborhood of a margin of victory of zero28.  
In particular, the baseline model I want to estimate is as follows:  
 
[1] 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝛽 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, 
 
where 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if candidate i wins the 
election at time t and zero otherwise; 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is an indicator 
variable for the incumbency status of a candidate such that 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡 equals one if the margin of victory at time t-1 is larger 
than zero and zero if it is negative; 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the stochastic error term. In the ideal case 
when the assignment of incumbency status is random, β is the difference in the 
probability of winning between incumbents and non-incumbents, or the true 
incumbency effect: 
 
[2] 𝐸[𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡| 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 1] − 𝐸[𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡| 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 0] = 𝛽.  
 
However, the assignment of incumbency status is likely to be non-random 
because incumbents and non-incumbents may have some idiosyncratic differences, 
such as charisma, charm, intelligence, party organization or campaign resources. In 
                                                          
28 Further, some chance factors, such as the weather conditions on the election day, that might affect 
the outcome of the election do not vary systematically between incumbents and non-incumbents. 
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this case, equation [2] includes a bias due to differences in candidates’ intrinsic 
characteristics, i.e. 𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑖,𝑡 :  
 
[3]    𝐸[𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡| 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 1] − 𝐸[𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡| 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 0] = 𝛽 + 𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑖,𝑡  
 
Equations (3) can alternatively be written as follows: 
 
[4] 𝐸[𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡|𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 > 0] − 𝐸[𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡|𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 < 0] = 𝛽 + 𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑖,𝑡, 
 
where 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 is the margin of victory of candidate i at time t-1. The 
RDD compares candidates at election t-1 who are marginally above the threshold 
of  margin of victory of zero with those who are marginally below the threshold: 
 
[5]     𝐸[𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡|0 < 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 ≤ µ] − 𝐸[𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡|−µ < 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 < 0] = 𝛽 + 𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠
∗
𝑖,𝑡, 
[6]     𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠∗𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐸[𝜀𝑖,𝑡|0 < 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 ≤ µ] − 𝐸[𝜀𝑖,𝑡 − µ < 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 < 0], 
 
where µ represents the closeness of the elections. As µ becomes smaller, 𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠∗𝑖,𝑡 
goes to zero and 𝛽 measures the casual incumbency effect: 
[7]    lim
µ→0+
𝐸[𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡|0 < 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 ≤ µ] −  lim
µ→0−
𝐸[𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡|−µ < 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 < 0] = 𝛽.  
 
The validity of the RDD about a random assignment of the incumbency status 
depends on the assumption that candidates around the threshold are similar. This 
implies that the identification strategy is valid, and that only incumbency status 
changes discontinuously as a function of the margin of victory and all other 
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characteristics vary smoothly29. The only assumption made here is that 
unobservable characteristics are continuous functions of the margin of victory at 
time t-1, which is a much weaker restriction on the stochastic error term and implies 
that g(𝜀𝑖,𝑡| 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1), the conditional density function of 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, is 
continuous. The continuity of observable characteristics will be checked in the next 
section. 
 
2.3  Institutional Framework and Data 
The system currently regulating municipal elections in Italy has been introduced in 
1993 (DL 25 March 1993, no. 81). It has established the direct election of the mayor 
and the adoption of the plurality rule, with some differences according to the size 
of the city. For municipalities with a population of fewer than 15,000 inhabitants, 
elections are held with single ballot and plurality rule: the winning candidate is 
awarded a majority premium of at least two-thirds of the seats in the council. For 
cities with a population above 15,000, elections are held using a dual ballot system 
(where the second ballot is held only if none of the candidates obtains an absolute 
majority of votes in the first ballot). Only the two leading candidates at the first 
round compete in the second ballot and the winning candidate is awarded a majority 
premium of at least 60 percent of the seats in the council. 
Since 1993, mayors have been subject to a two-term limit, while members of the 
Executive Committee and of the Municipal Council, endowed with legislative 
power, can be re-elected indefinitely. 
                                                          
29 The only assumption made is that unobservable characteristics are continuous functions of the 
forcing variable, i.e. the margin of victory. 
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Municipal elections in Italy are held every 5 years30 and Municipal governments 
cannot choose the election schedule. In certain circumstances, the legislature may 
not survive until the end of its legislative term, e.g. because of a mayor’s early 
resignation. In these cases, elections are held before the natural schedule, and, as a 
consequence, all subsequent elections will be held at different times from other 
municipalities that have completed the foreseen legislative term.  
Municipalities have a registry of eligible voters, which is revised whenever there 
is an election and all citizens aged 18 or above on the election date are automatically 
registered to vote. Voting takes place in polling stations organized by the local 
authorities. Elections are organized according to a traditional paper ballot system.  
My empirical analysis is based on a panel data set, provided by the Italian 
Ministry of the Internal Affairs. In order to focus on elections regulated by the same 
rules, I only consider municipalities with less than 15,000 inhabitants, in which 
elections are held with single ballot and plurality rule.31 Moreover, I drop elections 
in which Personal Incumbency is zero for both candidates. This might be the case 
either when bare losers and bare winners are freshman candidates at time t (open 
seats) or when the election is characterized by a binding term limit for the mayor32. 
I end up with a sample composed by 8,484 candidate-level observations (I have a 
bare winner and a bare loser from each election) for 3,352 Italian municipalities 
over the period 1993-2011.  
                                                          
30 With the exception of the years between 1993 and 1999, when the electoral mandate had a duration 
of 4 years. 
31 The results reported in this paper remain substantially unchanged if I include in my sample also 
municipalities voting under the dual ballot system (those with more than 15,000 inhabitants). Results 
are available upon request. 
32 According to the Italian law not all the incumbent mayors can run for election. Because of a term 
limit, mayors cannot spend more than two consecutive terms in office. Then, I define Binding Term 
Limit as a dummy variable equal to one if the term limit constraint is binding and equal to zero if 
the term limit is slack. In my analysis, since I am focusing on elections in which the mayor reruns 
in election t, the term limit is always slack. 
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For each municipal election I have information on the number of candidates who 
run for a mayor position at each election, on their gender, age, educational 
attainment, previous job, vote shares and party affiliation (Anagrafe degli 
Amministratori Locali, Ministero dell’Interno).33 Using this information, I build my 
dependent variable Win that equals 1 if the candidate i wins the election at time t 
and zero otherwise, Personal Incumbency taking the value of 1 when among the 
first two best candidates running for election at time t there is the exiting mayor and 
zero otherwise. In other words, Personal Incumbency is equal to one if the margin 
of victory at time t-1 is positive and zero otherwise. I define the margin of victory 
of a candidate in multicandidate races as follows: the winner’s margin of victory is 
the difference between his or her vote share and the vote share of the second-place 
candidate (divided by the number of valid ballots). Similarly, the margin of victory 
of a loser is the difference between his or her vote share and the vote share of the 
winner. This construct allows the margin of victory to be positive for winning 
candidates and negative for losing candidates (on average it is equal to 0.0049). 
Moreover, I build a dummy Partisan wing which is equal to 1 if candidates running 
for a mayor position do not belong to a national political party (Lista Civica) and 
zero otherwise, and Partisan Incumbency  which is equal to 1 if one of the parties 
competing at the electoral race at time t is an incumbent party and zero otherwise. 
From Table 1, I can notice that 52% of candidates running for election at time t 
have already been mayor in the previous legislature, 59% of candidates belong to a 
Lista Civica and 33% of parties competing at time t are incumbent.  
 
                                                          
33 It is possible to obtain detailed data at an individual level at the following website: 
http://amministratori.interno.it  
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations34 
Win 0.4954 0.5000 0 1 8,484 
Personal Incumbency 0.5223 0.4994 0 1 8,484 
Partisan Incumbency 0.3393 0.4735 0 1 8,484 
Partisan wing 0.5938 0.4911 0 1 8,484 
Electoral Margin (%) 0.0049 0.1270 -0.25 0.25 8,484 
Female Candidate 0.0929 0.2903 0 1 8,484 
Candidates’ Age 49.4578 9.8984 18 86 8,484 
Candidates’ Education 14.4789 3.4532 5 18 8,484 
∆ Candidates’ Age 0.0016 13.3641 -55 42 8,484 
∆ Candidates’ Education 0.1044 4.6202 -13 13 8,848 
No. Candidates 2.5806 0.7897 1 8 8,484 
Turnout 0.7809 0.0914 0.2162 0.9571 8,484 
Population Size/1,000 3.6707 3.2476 0.042 14.996 8,484 
Education of Population 7.0741 0.8393 4.4229 12.5668 8,484 
Employment 0.3217 0.1510 0.1745 0.6392 8,484 
Elderly People (>=65) 0.1974 0.0629 0.0434 0.5655 8,484 
Source: Local Administrators Data set (1985-2011), Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs; Italian Census of Population 
(1991 and 2001). 
 
Using the information on candidates' gender I have built a dummy variable 
Female Candidate taking the value of 1 for female candidates running for a mayor 
position and zero otherwise. The proportion of women, among the first two 
candidates, participating at the electoral competition is about 9% with a standard 
deviation of 0.29. Moreover, the average educational attainment of candidates 
(Candidates’ Education) is quite high (14 years of education), highlighting how the 
majority of candidates has at least obtained a high-school diploma,35 whereas the 
average age of the two best candidates running for a mayor position (Candidates’ 
Age) is about 49. Furthermore, to take into account that heterogeneous candidates 
may split votes more than homogeneous ones, I built both ∆ Candidates’ Age (with 
a mean of 0.0016), as measured by the difference in age between the first two best 
candidates, as well as ∆ Candidates’ Education (with a mean of 0.1044), i.e. the 
                                                          
34 The number of observations refers to the regression in which I add all my control variables, I 
restrict my analysis to elections held in municipalities with a population lower than 15,000 
inhabitants by choosing a bandwidth of 25 percent above and below the threshold of margin of 
victory of zero. 
35 In Italy, it takes 13 years to attain a High-School Degree while 17-18 years are necessary to attain 
a College Degree. Moreover, the educational attainment of people with a PhD or a Master degree is 
always 18 years in my sample. 
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difference in years of schooling between the first and second best candidate running 
at the electoral race. 
Furthermore, for each municipal election I have information on the number of 
voters and the number of people eligible to vote. I measure Turnout as the ratio 
between the number of voters and the number of eligible voters. As shown in Table 
2.1, Italy is characterized by a quite high electoral turnout compared to many 
European countries and to US: the average turnout in the period 1993-2011 has 
been of 78%, with a standard deviation of 0.0914. 
Finally, I use the 1991 and 2001 Italian Census of Population to obtain time 
varying information at municipal level regarding population size, the number of 
employed individuals, the proportion of elderly people and the educational 
attainment of the population36. The average population size of Italian municipalities 
is 3,67. The population’s number of years of education is, on average, 7.07, the ratio 
between the number of employed individuals and the number of not elderly 
inhabitants is 32% and the proportion of people aged 65 or above is on average 
19.74%. 
 
 
2.3.1 Smoothness Conditions and Validity of the Sharp RDD 
In this sub-section I check the validity of the Regression Discontinuity Design as a 
local randomized experiment. The general concern with my identification strategy 
is that some characteristics other than incumbency status vary discontinuously with 
respect to the margin of victory.  
                                                          
36 I use the 1991 census for elections taking place from 1993 to 1997 and the 2001 census for 
elections taking place since 1998. 
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As shown by Lee and Lemieux (2010) if variation in the treatment near the 
threshold is approximately randomized, then it follows that all “baseline 
characteristics” – all those variables determined prior to the realization of the 
assignment variable – should have the same distribution just above and just below 
the cutoff. If there is a discontinuity in these baseline covariates, then at a minimum, 
the underlying identifying assumption of individuals’ inability to precisely 
manipulate the assignment variable is unwarranted. 
It is standard in the RD design to demonstrate that treatment and control groups 
are similar in their observed baseline covariates. It is similarly impossible to test 
whether unobserved characteristics are balanced in the experimental context, so the 
most favorable statement that can be made about the experiment is that the data 
“failed to reject” the assumption of randomization (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). In 
other words, since information about unobserved characteristics of candidates and 
municipalities is not available, the focus is on observed characteristics, such as the 
educational attainment of candidates, the age of candidates running for a mayor 
position, the proportion of female candidates, the partisanship, the voter turnout, 
the number of candidates competing for election, the population’s level of 
education, the employment rate and the proportion of people aged 65 or above.  
 To check whether the assumptions of the RD are satisfied, I present a test of the 
continuity of the distribution of the covariates at the cut-point. The idea behind this 
kind of test is to regress a covariate on a third or fourth order polynomial of the 
forcing variable along with a dummy for the treatment status: a statistically 
insignificant coefficient for the treatment dummy is taken as evidence in favor of 
local random assignment (Caughey and Sekhon, 2011; Lee, 2008; Lee, Moretti and 
Butler, 2004). 
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   Table 2.2: Incumbency Effect and Predetermined Characteristics 
Variables Coefficient on Incumbent 
Bandwidth ±25 
% 
(1) 
Bandwidth ±5 
% 
(2) 
Bandwidth ±2 % 
(3) 
Candidates’ Education 0.174  
(0.191) 
0.321  
(0.467) 
0.537  
(0.798) 
Candidates’ Age 2.429*** 
(0.513) 
2.881** 
(1.212) 
3.989*  
(2.165) 
Female Candidates -0.044 *** 
(0.016) 
-0.043  
(0.034) 
-0.078  
(0.051) 
Partisan wing 0.021 
(0.023) 
-0.038 
(0.049) 
-0.097 
(0.069) 
No. Candidates 0.003  
(0.030) 
0.043  
(0.039) 
0.004  
(0.016) 
Turnout 0.002* 
(0.001) 
0.001  
(0.001) 
0.001  
(0.001) 
Population’s Education 0.007  
(0.007) 
-0.012 
(0.008) 
-0.001  
(0.005) 
Employment -0.001  
(0.001) 
-0.001  
(0.002) 
-0.001  
(0.001) 
Elderly People -0.001*  
(0.000) 
-0.001  
(0.000) 
-0.001  
(0.000) 
N. of Observations 8,484 2,366 1,003 
N. of Municipalities 3,352 1,855 477 
Notes: The dependent variable is specified in each row. The regression regresses the dependent variable on the 
incumbency status. In each regression I control for, annual and municipal fixed effects and for a cubic polynomial of 
the assignment variable. Robust standard errors are in brackets, clustered at municipal level. The symbols ***, **, * 
indicate that coefficients are statistically significant, respectively, at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
 
In Table 2.2 I test whether the incumbency status is predictive of a larger set of 
municipal and candidates’ characteristics, by choosing a bandwidth of 25, 5 and 2 
percent above and below the margin of victory threshold respectively, and by 
controlling for a third-order polynomial of the forcing variable, and for municipal-
time fixed effects. Moreover, standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and 
are clustered at the municipal level.  
Overall, Table 2.2 shows that the incumbency status predicts some of the 
predetermined characteristics when I choose a bandwidth of 25 percent (column 1). 
However, the coefficient on my variable of interest becomes smaller and 
statistically insignificant (see columns 2 and 3) as I examine closer elections (the 
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margin of victory gets closer to zero).37Over 9 covariates, only the coefficient on 
Candidates’ Age is statistically significant at 10 percent level. Since not all the 
predetermined characteristics are balanced I add them as control variables in the 
specifications of my model displayed in the next section. 
As a last specification test of my design, I perform, in Figure 2.1, a McCrary test 
by running a kernel local linear regressions of the log of the density separately on 
both sides of the threshold (McCrary, 2008), by considering observations in a 
bandwidth of 5 percent close to the zero margin of victory. If there were any 
discontinuities in the neighborhood of the cutoff point, one might be concerned that 
incumbent candidates are able to manipulate the margin of victory at time t-1, or in 
other words if individuals have a great deal of control over the assignment variable 
and if there is a perceived benefit to a treatment, one would certainly expect 
individuals on one side of the threshold (incumbents) to be systematically different 
from those on the other side (challengers).  
One leading class of explanations for manipulation of vote share by incumbent 
politicians focus on incumbent control over voter information and individual effort. 
Essentially, the perks of public office may allow incumbents to strategically 
manipulate voter information and individual effort in order to signal their 
desirability to voters (Besley, 2006; Ashworth, 2006; Serra & Moon, 1994). 
Moreover, in the pre-electoral stage, incumbents may have advantages in the 
mobilization of campaign funds and political endorsements through stronger 
political networks and the incentives of potential contributors to align themselves 
                                                          
37 The same findings hold true when I implement a difference-in-means test for the predetermined 
characteristics mentioned above between bare winners and bare losers (results are available upon 
request). 
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with the expected winner (see Gordon & Landa, 2009).  In this setting, I expect 
incumbent politicians to have a certain amount of influence on their vote share, but 
precise sorting would require extensive manipulation. For example, incumbents 
would not only need to know that the election will be close in advance, but that they 
are just short of winning and then be able to manipulate to vote into a win for them. 
However, as Figure 2.1 depicts, the log-difference between the frequency to the 
right and to the left of the threshold is not statistically significant at conventional 
levels (it is equal to 0.222 with a standard deviation of 0.138), and in turn incumbent 
politicians do not have any control on the electoral margin at time t-1. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: McCrary test – Manipulation Assignment Variable 
 
 
 
2.4 Sharp RDD Estimates: Main Results 
In this section, to understand whether an incumbent has a personal advantage 
compared to his/her challengers in terms of winning the electoral competition at 
time t, I implement a Sharp RDD and estimate a linear probability model with fixed 
effects at municipal level: 
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[1]  𝑃𝑟 (𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑓(𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛)𝑖,𝑡−1 +
+𝜑𝑗 + µ𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡,  
 
where 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the candidate i wins the 
electoral competition at time t in municipality j and zero otherwise; 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is my main variable of interest measuring the 
incumbency status of candidates at the electoral race running for the mayor position 
in the municipality j at time t; 𝑋𝑗,𝑡 is a vector including controls for municipal 
characteristics at the time of elections (population size, voter turnout, the average 
number of years of education of the inhabitants, the number of employed people 
over the number of not elderly inhabitants and the fraction of elderly people in the 
population) and electoral competition’s characteristics (i.e. the number of 
candidates at the electoral race); 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 is a vector including controls for candidates’ 
characteristics (the age of candidates, a dummy variable 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
taking the value of 1 for female candidates and zero otherwise, the educational 
attainment of candidates at the electoral race, the difference in age and educational 
attainment between the first two best candidates, candidates’ party affiliation and a 
dummy variable 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑛 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡 that measures the incumbency status of 
candidates’ parties at the electoral race)  φ
j
 and µt are respectively a municipal and 
a year fixed effect. The municipal fixed effects 𝜑𝑗 accounts for time-invariant 
municipal characteristics, whereas 𝜇𝑡 is used to take into account any differences 
across time. 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is the stochastic component in my model. 
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Moreover, f(.) is a polynomial function for the forcing variable, i.e. the degree 
of electoral competition at time t-1, as measured by the difference in votes (%) 
between the winner and his/her closest challenger. As stated by Lee and Lemieux 
(2010), trying more flexible specification of my model by adding polynomials in 
the forcing variable as regressors is an important and useful way of assessing the 
robustness of the RD estimates of the treatment effect. 
In all regressions standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are 
clustered at the municipal level to take into account the fact that candidates’ 
behavior in the same municipality may be affected by common shocks. Further, in 
all the specifications I control for a third order polynomial of the electoral margin 
at time t-138, I choose a bandwidth of 25 percent above and below the threshold of 
margin of victory of zero and I focus on elections held with single ballot and 
plurality rule only. 
Furthermore, in my analysis I focus on elections where there is an incumbent 
among candidates competing for a mayoral position. This might lead to a selection 
bias in my estimates since the rerunning decisions might differ systematically 
between incumbents and challengers, especially at local races. Some authors (see 
Uppal, 2009; Trounstine, 2011) have conditioned their incumbency estimates on 
candidates who rerun in election t, since the classical RDD would be to condition 
on re-running as this compares random losers of the previous election (challenger) 
with random winners (incumbents). Also this solution could give rise to a sample 
selection bias issue in the estimated incumbency effect if bare losers who rerun are 
systematically different from losers who do not rerun. Unfortunately, I cannot 
condition my estimates on candidates who rerun in election t since at Italian 
                                                          
38 The inclusion of polynomials of order higher than three does not affect my main results. 
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municipal elections challengers are always different from election at time t-1 to next 
election, and in turn I compare (potentially non-random) challengers with random 
incumbents. Moreover, conditional incumbency advantage/disadvantage has been 
strongly criticized by De Magalhaes (2014) because if 𝐸(𝑅1𝑖 − 𝑅0𝑖 ) ≠ 0
39, then 
conditioning the RDD sample on rerunning implies that the control and treatment 
groups are no longer likely to be balanced and in turn, RDD is not valid to estimate 
the causal effect of incumbency conditional on rerunning. All in all my empirical 
findings must be interpreted with reference to the selected sub-population which 
data were sampled, i.e. elections where an incumbent decides to run.  
RDD results are shown in Figure 2.2 (Panel a, b and c). In particular, I plot the 
estimated probability of winning the electoral competition at time t against the 
margin of victory at time t-1, close to the zero threshold, with a bandwidth of 25 
percent above and below the cutoff, by using a nonparametric methods, i.e. I 
estimate a model that does not assume a functional form between my dependent 
variable and the forcing variable (Hahn et al., 2000). In Panel (a) I focus on elections 
in which an incumbent reruns for election in municipalities with a population size 
lower than 15,000, whereas in Panel (b) and (c) I show the incumbency advantage 
for southern and northern municipalities respectively again for elections held with 
single ballot and plurality rule.  
The circles represent the raw probability of winning, while the connected points 
are the predicted values from a linear probability model of an indicator variable for 
victory at time t on the margin of victory at time t-1. As shown in Panel (a), there 
is a sharp discontinuous jump right at the zero cutoff. Barely winners are much 
                                                          
39 Where R is a dichotomous variable taking the value 1 if the politician runs and zero otherwise. 
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more likely to succeed in the next election, compared to bare losers. The same 
findings are highlighted in Panel (b) and (c), although the effect of the incumbency 
on the probability of winning the electoral competition is larger in northern 
municipalities compared to southern municipalities. Overall, graphs highlight 
results displayed in the following tables (Table 2.3 and 2.4). 
 
 
 
                                                     Figure 2.2: RDD Estimates – Incumbency Advantage 
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Table 2.3 presents the main results. In column (1) in which I control for year and 
municipal fixed effects as only, I find that the incumbent has an advantage in 
winning the electoral competition at time t: the personal incumbency effect is about 
35.8 percentage points, implying that incumbents (bare winners) are more likely to 
win the competition compared to their challengers (bare losers). 
 
Table 2.3: RDD Estimates – Personal Incumbency Advantage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
VARIABLES Pr(win) Pr(win) Pr(win) Pr(win) 
     
Personal Incumbency 0.358*** 0.335*** 0.335*** 0.335*** 
 (0.032) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Partisan Incumbency  0.038 0.038 0.038 
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Partisan wing  0.028 0.028 0.028 
  (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Candidates’ Age  -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Candidates’ Education  0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
∆ Candidates’ Age  0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
∆ Candidates’ Education  0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Female Candidates  -0.119*** -0.119*** -0.119*** 
  (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Turnout   -0.125* -0.127* 
   (0.071) (0.071) 
Education Population   -0.005 -0.005 
   (0.012) (0.012) 
Employment   0.037 0.036 
   (0.075) (0.075) 
Elderly People   0.013 0.005 
   (0.205) (0.204) 
Population Size/1,000   0.012 0.012 
   (0.024) (0.024) 
Population Size^2   0.001 0.001 
   (0.001) (0.001) 
No. Candidates    -0.003 
    (0.004) 
Constant 0.315*** 0.469*** 0.543*** 0.555*** 
 (0.019) (0.064) (0.188) (0.188) 
     
Bandwidth ±25% ±25% ±25% ±25% 
Electoral Margin Polynomial Third Third Third Third 
Observations 8,484 8,484 8,484 8,484 
R-squared 0.250 0.257 0.257 0.257 
Number of Municipalities 3,352 3,352 3,352 3,352 
Notes: The dependent variable is the probability of winning the election at time t. I control for municipalities fixed 
effects and for electoral year dummies (not reported) in all the regressions. I focus on municipalities with a population 
size lower than 15,000 inhabitants. Standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity and clusterized at the municipality 
level) are reported in parenthesis. The symbols ***,**,* indicate that coefficients are statistically significant 
respectively at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
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In column (2) I add some candidates’ characteristics as control variables. Again 
I find a positive and statistically significant incumbency effect on the probability of 
winning the electoral competition at time t. The same results hold true also when I 
control for municipalities’ characteristics (column 3) and for the number of 
candidates running for a mayor position (column 4). 
As far as my control variables (municipal and candidates’ characteristics) are 
concerned, I find the expected results. Most of candidates’ characteristics matter. 
In fact, having one female candidate running for the mayor position negatively 
affects the probability of winning the electoral competition, highlighting a sort of 
discrimination toward women since electors prefer male candidates compared to 
females. Further, having elderly candidates negatively affects my dependent 
variable, maybe because electors like younger candidates more. Conversely, having 
more educated candidates positively affects the probability of winning the electoral 
race.  
Moreover, I do not find any partisan incumbency effect on the probability of 
winning the electoral competition: at Italian mayoral elections it does not matter if 
parties competing at the electoral race are incumbent or not. Finally, most of the 
municipalities’ characteristics do not produce any statistically significant impact on 
my outcome variable.  
All in all, the personal incumbency effect is always positive, statistically 
significant at 1 percent level and stable across specifications displayed in Table 2.3. 
This reassures me that adding further control variables does not dramatically affect 
the impact of my variable of interest on the probability of winning the competition 
at time t. In other words, results confirm the random assignment of the incumbency 
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status around the threshold of margin of victory of zero (Imbens and Lemieux, 
2008)40. 
In Table 2.4 I replicate estimations presented in the previous table for 
municipalities located in the Center-South and in the North of Italy in order to take 
into account the fact that the incumbency advantage may be dissimilar in different 
parts of Italy. In particular, Italy is very heterogeneous in terms of economic and 
social condition, with the northern part being richer and endowed with higher social 
capital compared to the South. In columns (1) and (2) I run a regression for 
municipalities located in the South, whereas in columns (3) and (4) I focus on 
northern municipalities.  
As highlighted in Table 2.4 in both areas the incumbent has a personal advantage 
in terms of winning the election at time t: the coefficient on my variable of interest 
is always statistically significant at 1 percent level and stable across the 
specifications, since it is not affected by the inclusion of the control variables, such 
as municipalities, candidates and electoral competition’ characteristics. 
However, the personal incumbency effect on the outcome variable is larger in 
terms of magnitude for northern municipalities compared to those located in the 
South. In particular, bare winners are 41.6 percentage points more likely to win the 
competition compared to bare losers in the North. On the other hand, for southern 
municipalities the incumbent advantage seems to be 26.3 percentage points. 
This is due because the channels through which the incumbency status affects 
the outcome variable are different in municipalities located in the Center-South 
compared to those in the North of Italy. In fact, as highlighted by Stolfi et al. 
                                                          
40 I also find a positive and statistically significant effect (at 1 percent level) of the incumbency status 
on the vote share (results are available upon request).  
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(2016)41 in less economically developed regions there is a greater share of 
‘exchange’ voters, i.e. electors who decide to go to the polls and cast votes 
exclusively because of personal benefits they receive once incumbents are re-
elected (see for instance Bellucci, 1991). This point of view is supported by studies 
(see Chiaramonte and Di Virgilio, 2000; Fantozzi and De Luca, 2010) showing that 
higher prevalence of preference voting and greater voter mobility characterize 
poorer southern regions compared to richer regions located in the North of Italy. 
Conversely, in rich areas clientelistic relationships are less frequent, and in turn 
citizens are more likely to punish bad performing incumbents by increasing support 
for challengers, or to reward well performing incumbents, leading in this case to an 
increase in the probability of winning the electoral race. 
In column (5) in order to test if the heterogeneous effect of the incumbency status 
on the probability of winning the electoral race is statistically different from zero, I 
use the full sample and interact all covariates by the variable South that takes a value 
of 1 if the municipality is located in the Center-South and zero otherwise. The linear 
combination between the coefficient associated to Personal Incumbent and 
Personal Incumbent*South is statistically significant at 1 percent level, and in 
particular it is equal to 0.272 with a standard deviation of 0.05. 
Another potential explanation supporting the idea that the incumbency 
advantage is different in terms of magnitude between Center-South and North, is 
that population plagued with high levels of poverty, deficient public services, and 
with its basic necessities unsatisfied lives in an area of “endemic discontent” 
                                                          
41 Stolfi et al. (2016) find that in less developed areas In Italy voters are dependent on the income 
provided by incumbents compared to voters in richer areas, and in turn incumbents are better able 
to use clientelistic government spending for short-term electoral advantage in the former than in 
the latter. 
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(Molina, 2001) and as a consequence, it is difficult for the incumbent in the southern 
municipalities to satisfy the majority of voters and in turn, it is quite normal to 
expect that candidates in power will suffer a loss in terms of winning the electoral 
competition compared to candidates holding power in the North. Similar results are 
found by Molina (2001) for many Latin American and Caribbean countries.  
Finally, in the last two columns of Table 2.4, to enforce the idea that the 
heterogeneous effect of Personal Incumbency on my outcome variable is essentially 
due to economic differences between Center-South and North of Italy, I split the 
sample based on regional gdp per capita in 2011 and run the same regression as that 
presented in the previous table. In particular, in column (6) I focus on municipalities 
belonging to regions with a gdp per capita lower than the median value, wheras in 
column (7) I look at municipalities located in regions with a gdp per capita above 
the median value. Results are similar to those presented in the first four columns of 
Table 2.4. In fact, in low-gdp municipalities incumbent politicians have an 
advantage in winning the electoral competition compared to challengers and in 
particular, the effect of my variable of interest is 24.9 percentage points on the 
outcome variable, while in high-gdp municipalities, Personal Incumbency has an 
effect of 41 percentage points on the probability of winning the electoral race.  
Moreover, it may be that incumbency advantage is lower in the South, since in 
areas with high corruption and low social capital, frequent changes in mayors are 
the only way to exert democratic control. Further, I cannot exclude other channels, 
such as the electors' desire to punish incumbent politicians, who may have poorly 
performed in less developed areas, and to vote in favor of a new candidate. In fact, 
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in both cases I would expect a smaller incumbency advantage in areas endowed 
with lower social capital such as the South of Italy. 
 
Table 2.4: RDD Estimates – Personal Incumbency Advantage South vs North 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
VARIABLES Pr(win) 
Center-
South 
Pr(win) 
Center-
South 
Pr(win) 
North 
Pr(win) 
North 
Pr(win) 
Full 
Sample 
Pr(win) 
Low GDP 
Pr(win) 
High GDP 
        
Personal Incumbency 0.266*** 0.263*** 0.416*** 0.416*** 0.408*** 0.249*** 0.410*** 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.055) (0.045) 
Personal Incumbency*South     -0.136*   
     (0.071)   
Partisan Incumbency 0.046 0.047 0.016 0.021 0.020 0.055 0.016 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.038) (0.030) 
Partisan wing 0.010 0.009 0.025 0.030 0.035 0.011 0.027 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.032) (0.024) 
Candidates’ Age  -0.002*  -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.002 -0.004*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Candidates’ Education  0.003  0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 
  (0.004)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
∆ Candidates’ Age  0.001  -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
∆ Candidates’ Education  -0.001  0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Female Candidates  -0.123**  -0.117*** -0.116*** -0.121** -0.119*** 
  (0.048)  (0.035) (0.035) (0.052) (0.033) 
Turnout  -0.176**  -0.007 -0.071 -0.161* -0.033 
  (0.084)  (0.135) (0.121) (0.093) (0.114) 
Education Population  -0.002  -0.023 -0.013 -0.005 -0.018 
  (0.013)  (0.028) (0.018) (0.0142) (0.022) 
Employment  0.089  0.005 0.021 0.060 0.010 
  (0.077)  (0.076) (0.086) (0.082) (0.074) 
Elderly People  -0.063  -0.003 -0.048 -0.059 -0.031 
  (0.251)  (0.366) (0.223) (0.298) (0.324) 
Population Size/1,000  -0.010  0.042 0.0472 -0.031 0.043* 
  (0.036)  (0.030) (0.029) (0.044) (0.025) 
Population Size^2  0.001  -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
No. Candidates  -0.016**  0.004 0.006 -0.022** 0.004 
  (0.007)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) 
Constant 0.354*** 0.625*** 0.284*** 0.511 0.579*** 0.697*** 0.507* 
 (0.0277) (0.216) (0.028) (0.341) (0.203) (0.245) (0.273) 
        
Bandwidth ±25% ±25% ±25% ±25% ±25% ±25% ±25% 
Electoral Margin Polynomial Third Third Third Third Third Third Third 
Observations 4,080 4,080 4,584 4,584 8,484 3,526 5,138 
R-squared 0.199 0.202 0.306 0.315 0.259 0.195 0.307 
Number of Municipalities 1,582 1,582 1,840 1,840 3,352 1,372 2,050 
Notes: The dependent variable is the probability of winning the election at time t. I control for municipalities 
fixed effects and for electoral year dummies (not reported) in all the regressions. Standard errors (corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and clusterized at the municipality level) are reported in parenthesis. The symbols ***,**,* 
indicate that coefficients are statistically significant respectively at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
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2.5  Robustness Checks 
In this section I check the robustness of my results. Firstly, I consider only data in 
narrow neighborhoods around the discontinuity point (Local Linear Regression). 
Secondly, by choosing a large bandwidth around the zero margin of victory 
threshold, I include interaction terms between 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡 and 
different polynomials of the margin of victory in my regression.  
In particular, as a first robustness check, I re-estimate my original model by 
narrowing the sample close to the treatment threshold and choosing a bandwidth of 
5 and 2 percent respectively above and below the cutoff of margin of victory of 
zero. Table 2.5 reports the Sharp RDD results for the discontinuity samples.  
In columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.5, in which I control for a third-order 
polynomial of the forcing variable, I focus on elections held with single ballot and 
plurality rule and I choose a bandwidth of 5 percent above and below the electoral 
margin threshold. I find that the personal incumbency effect on the probability of 
winning the electoral competition is positive and statistically significant at 1 percent 
level. Similar results are obtained in columns (3) and (4), where the window has 
been narrowed at 2 percent above and below the cutoff. All in all, the incumbency 
effect tends to be stable across the specifications. Moreover, in the last two columns 
I present results for southern municipalities (column 5) and northern municipalities 
(column 6). Again I find that in both areas bare winners have a personal advantage 
in winning the competition compared to bare losers, although the effect of my 
variable of interest is larger in the North. 
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Table 2.5: RDD Estimates – Personal Incumbency Advantage – Discontinuity Samples 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
     South North 
VARIABLES Pr (win) Pr (win) Pr (win) Pr (win) Pr (win) Pr (win) 
       
Personal Incumbency 0.404*** 0.396*** 0.350*** 0.331*** 0.262** 0.542*** 
 (0.079) (0.079) (0.129) (0.127) (0.116) (0.106) 
       
Controls No All No All All All 
Bandwidth ±5% ±5% ±2% ±2% ±5% ±5% 
Electoral Margin 
Polynomial 
Third Third Third Third Third Third 
Observations 2,366 2,366 1,003 1,003 1,168 1,198 
R-squared 0.149 0.157 0.158 0.188 0.113 0.224 
Number of Municipalities 1,085 1,085 477 477 529 556 
Notes: The dependent variable is the probability of winning the election at time t. I control for municipalities fixed 
effects and for electoral year dummies (not reported) in all the regressions. I focus on municipalities with a 
population size lower than 15,000 inhabitants and on elections characterized by a slack term limit for the mayor. 
Standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity and clusterized at the municipality level) are reported in 
parenthesis. The symbols ***,**,* indicate that coefficients are statistically significant respectively at the 1, 5, 
and 10 percent level. 
 
As a second robustness check, I add interaction terms between my variable of 
interest and different polynomial functions of the assignment variable, i.e. the 
electoral margin, to check whether my model is well-specified, and whether the 
coefficient of 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is stable in terms of sign and magnitude 
independently from the specification used. Further, I choose a bandwidth of 25 
percent above and below the zero margin of victory threshold and I control for a 
third-order polynomial of the margin of victory and for municipal-time fixed effects 
in all the specifications. Table 2.6 shows the main results.  
All in all, the coefficient on the personal incumbency status is always positive, 
statistically significant at 1 percent level and stable across the specifications42. 
Further, the magnitude of the effect is very similar to that found in Table 2.3 
(column 4) and Table 2.4 (column 2 and 4) where I applied a Sharp RD design 
without interaction terms.  
 
                                                          
42 The results are still similar when I interact the incumbency status with polynomials of the margin 
of victory of order higher than three. 
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Table 2.6: RDD Estimates – Personal Incumbency Advantage – Interaction Terms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
   South North 
VARIABLES Pr (win) Pr (win) Pr (win) Pr (win) 
     
Personal Incumbency 0.356*** 0.327*** 0.208*** 0.442*** 
 (0.045) (0.048) (0.074) (0.065) 
     
Controls No All All All 
Bandwidth ±25% ±25% ±25% ±25% 
Electoral Margin Polynomial Third Third Third Third 
Interaction Terms Third Third Third Third 
Observations 8,664 8,664 4,080 4,584 
R-squared 0.258 0.265 0.211 0.320 
Number of Municipalities 3,422 3,422 1,582 1,840 
Notes: The dependent variable is the probability of winning the election at time t. I control for municipalities fixed 
effects and for electoral year dummies (not reported) in all the regressions. I focus on municipalities with a 
population size lower than 15,000 inhabitants and on elections characterized by a slack term limit for the mayor. 
Standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity and clusterized at the municipality level) are reported in 
parenthesis. The symbols ***,**,* indicate that coefficients are statistically significant respectively at the 1, 5, 
and 10 percent level. 
 
 
2.6   Concluding Remarks 
One of the greatest concerns in a democracy is that elected officials might become 
entrenched or that running for office simply becomes too expensive for fresh-
candidates. By the nature of the democratic system, being incumbent is intrinsically 
advantageous since he/she is given access to resources and decision processes that 
non-incumbent challengers do not have. If elected officials are able to use their 
political influence to remain in power, voters will have a limited influence on their 
policy decisions (Linden, 2004). 
The general results in the literature have shown, on the one hand, a personal 
incumbency advantage both at the state (Garand, 1991; King, 1990; Cox and 
Morgenstern, 1993) and federal level (Erikson, 1971; Alford and Hibbing, 1981; 
Alford and Brady, 1988; Gelman and King, 1990) in U.S. House elections, since 
the incumbent candidate has a higher likelihood of winning the elections compared 
to his/her challengers, and on the other hand, an incumbency disadvantage for some 
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developing countries, such as India (Linden, 2004; Uppal, 2009), Latin America 
and Caribbean countries (Molina, 2001). 
In this paper I have investigated the personal incumbency effect on the 
probability of winning the electoral competition at municipal level in Italy over the 
period 1993-2011. I have implemented a regression discontinuity design (RDD) 
and focused on very close elections which are decided by a narrow margin of 
victory, where the bare winners and bare losers of these elections are assumed to be 
comparable in their unobservable characteristics. In this way, by following Lee 
(2008), I have identified the causal effect of the incumbency status on my outcome 
variable. 
My findings highlight a personal incumbency advantage since incumbents are 
34.3 percentage points more likely to win the competition compared to their 
challengers. Moreover, results hold true also when I control both for candidates and 
municipalities’ characteristics as well as for partisanship and partisan incumbency 
effect. Further, I also find similar results when I consider only data in narrow 
neighborhoods around the discontinuity point (Local Linear Regression) and when 
I include interaction terms between the treatment variable and different polynomials 
of the forcing variable, i.e. the margin of victory at time t-1. 
Finally, I have analyzed the personal incumbency effect separately for 
municipalities located in the Center-South and in the North of Italy in order to take 
into account the fact that the incumbency advantage may be dissimilar in different 
parts of Italy, since the northern part is richer and endowed with higher social 
capital compared to the South. I have found that in both areas the incumbent has a 
personal advantage in terms of winning the election at time t, although the effect of 
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interest is larger in magnitude for northern municipalities compared to southern 
municipalities. One potential explanation is that when population plagued with high 
levels of poverty, deficient public services, and with its basic necessities unsatisfied 
lives in an area of “endemic discontent” (Molina, 2001), it will be hard for the 
incumbent in the southern municipalities to satisfy the majority of voters and as a 
consequence, candidates in power will suffer a loss in terms of winning the electoral 
competition compared to candidates holding power in the North. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
The Effect of Council Size on Municipal Expenditures: 
Evidence from Italian Municipalities 
 
 
 
 
3.1  Introduction 
A common issue in modern democracies is whether politicians allocate resources 
efficiently. A conspicuous body of literature has tried to understand how politicians 
make decisions, especially in terms of budget choices and how executive 
fragmentation (i.e. the number of spending legislators) affects governments' 
budgets (see Kontopoulos and Perotti, 1999; Persson and Tabellini, 2000; Baqir, 
2001; Bradbury and Stephenson, 2003; Perotti and Kontpoulos, 2002; Per-
Petterson-Lidbom, 2012; Besley and Case, 2003). 
According to the fiscal common theory (Tullock, 1959; Buchanan and Tullock, 
1962), politicians, in order to obtain a greater electoral support, try to satisfy the 
needs of particular groups of constituencies to the detriment of the general 
community. In fact, government spending typically benefits a narrow segment of 
the population, whereas taxes are distributed broadly. In line with this theoretical 
approach, Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen (1981) propose a model in which the 
appropriation of government spending for localized projects (secured essentially to 
bring money to a representative’s district - pork barrel -) plays an important role in 
explaining the relationship between legislature size and government size. They 
show that government spending increases with the number of legislative districts: 
since politicians try to benefit well-defined groups, such as voters in the electoral 
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district, at general community expense, pork barrel spending as well as other 
distributive policies will lead to an increase in total government spending. Each 
legislator (or district) internalizes all the benefits related to the implementation of a 
particular project but, on the other hand, he (it) only internalizes a fraction of the 
cost (taxes are spread across districts). 
This result, often referred to “Law of 1/n”, finds support in a number of empirical 
analyses showing a positive relationship between legislature size and government 
size. In particular, Gilligan and Matsusaka (2001) study the relationship between 
legislature size and government size by using data on States in the US in the first 
and second half of the 20th Century. They find that expenditures increase with the 
state upper chamber size, but they are not affected by the state lower chamber size. 
Del Rossi and Inman (1999) examine spending decisions for the American 
Congress and highlight how the support provided by legislators in order to finance 
public expenditures is negatively correlated to the specific cost borne by every 
single constituency. Bradbury and Crain (2001), using US data, find a positive 
relationship between legislature size and spending within the States considered, 
even though the effect tends to be stronger in unicameral legislatures. Bradbury and 
Stephenson (2003) empirically test “Law of 1/n” by using a sample of Georgia’s 
counties. After controlling for many factors that may affect local expenditures, they 
find the number of county commissioners to be positively correlated to the county 
expenditures. 
However, the idea according to which an increase in council size leads to an 
increase in government outflows has been criticized from both a theoretical and an 
empirical point of view. Primo and Snyder (2005) show that results found by 
Weingast et al. (1981) are not robust to alterations of the standard model. In 
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particular, they demonstrate that the positive relationship between spending and 
legislature size is based on several factors, such as the type of good being provided, 
the costs of raising revenues, whether the local government has to share in the 
project’s cost with the central government etc. Once these factors are taken into 
account the relationship between total spending and legislature size might reverse 
and become instead negative (reverse law of 1/n). 
Furthermore, the empirical analysis supporting the idea of a positive relationship 
between council size and government spending may not identify causal effects, for 
example, because of reverse causality problems (government size may affect 
legislature size: a large public sector might require a large number of individuals 
involved in the budget-decision-making process). 
Recently some empirical studies have undertaken estimation strategies able to 
handle these problems. Nevertheless, results obtained are inconclusive. The mixed 
findings highlighted in the empirical literature might be due not only to different 
econometric techniques but also to certain country-level characteristics. In fact, as 
shown by Persson et al. (2007), the electoral rule affects government spending, but 
only indirectly: proportional elections induce a more fragmented party system and 
a larger incidence of coalition governments than do majoritarian elections. 
Moreover, the higher government spending in countries adopting a proportional 
system is financed to a greater extent with deficits (borrowing), than spending in 
other countries. Put differently, countries with proportional election rules tend to 
not only spend more than other countries, they also tend to borrow more to finance 
their spending.  
With regard to the effect of council size on government spending at local level, 
Egger and Koethenbuerger (2010) and Hirota and Yunoue (2012), by considering 
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municipalities in the German state of Bavaria and in Japan respectively (where 
electors vote under a mixed electoral system), implement a Regression 
Discontinuity Design and find a positive relationship between public expenditures 
and legislature size. The same econometric strategy is adopted by Per-Petterson-
Lidbom (2012), who instead finds a negative causal effect of legislature size on 
local government expenditures both for Finnish and Swedish municipalities 
(adopting a proportional system). Overall, Per-Petterson-Lidbom (2012)’ findings 
stress how the heterogeneous effect of legislature size on government size found in 
different countries is not related to the adopted electoral system, since in Finnish 
and Sweden municipalities, that vote under a proportional rule, the larger the 
number of legislators the lower government expenditures are. 
In this paper I present new evidence regarding the impact of council size on 
government spending using a rich data set on Italian municipal budgets over the 
period 2001-2007. To solve endogeneity problems, I rely on the exogenous 
variation in legislature size induced by the Italian law, establishing that Council size 
is a deterministic step function of population size. This law introduces a 
discontinuity in municipal Council size around some known thresholds of a 
continuous variable (population size), allowing me to implement a Sharp 
Regression Discontinuity Design to identify the casual effect of Council size on 
local government spending. Unfortunately, the number of legislators within the 
Municipal Council is not the only policy that changes around the population 
thresholds: also Mayors and Executive Committee members’ wage varies 
discontinuously around the same thresholds that generate a discontinuity in the 
Council size. 
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Since the wage earned by Italian Mayors in each municipality is not observed I 
handle the mentioned issue by adding some more control variables that provide 
information on the quality and experience of elected politicians. I find a negative 
and statistically significant effect of Council size on total expenditures. If the 
Council size increases by 1 unit, the total municipal expenditures per capita 
decrease by 0.6 percent. Similar results emerge when I consider as dependent 
variables current expenditures per capita and capital expenditures per capita. One 
possible interpretation for these findings is that an increase in the number of 
Councilors leads to a better monitoring of bureaucrats in terms of spending, 
mitigating the agency problems and heightening the efficiency of the entire local 
public administration. 
The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 3.2 I present the institutional 
framework and the data I use. Section 3.3 presents the methodology. In Section 3.4 
the validity of the empirical methodology is tested. In section 3.5 the main results 
are presented. Section 3.6 presents some robustness checks, whereas Section 3.7 
concludes. 
 
3.2  Institutional Setting and Data Description 
In Italy, municipal administrations are involved in a number of important functions 
such as the management of public utilities (local roads, water, sewage and garbage 
collection), the provision of public housing, transportation and nursery schools, and 
the assistance of elderly people. Since these services have a great impact on 
citizens’ daily lives, voters are generally very interested in the composition and in 
the performance of Municipal Councils. 
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 The main bodies within municipalities are the Executive Committee (Giunta 
Comunale) and the Municipal Council (Consiglio Municipale). The executive 
authority is assigned to a Mayor (Sindaco) heading an Executive Committee, while 
the Municipal Council is endowed with legislative power. The Municipal Council’s 
main functions are to supervise (with majority rule) the legislative activity of the 
Mayor and to endorse policies, such as the Municipal Development Plan, the Plan 
of Public Works as well as the Budget.43  
As shown in Table 3.1, the Italian law (Legislative Decree n. 267/2000) 
establishes that the Municipal Council is composed by the Mayor and by a variable 
number of Councilors, which depends on municipal population size.  
 
Table 3.1: Council Size for Italian Municipalities- Legislative Decree no. 267/2000 
Population Size Council Size 
Less than 3,000 12 
3,000 ˫10,000 16 
10,000 ˫30,000 20 
30,000 ˫100,000 30 
100,000 ˫250,000 40 
250,000 ˫500,000 46 
500,000  ˫1,000,000 50 
Above 1,000,000 60 
 
In Figure 3.1, I plot Council size against population size in the neighborhood of 
the first three thresholds (3,000; 10,000 and 30,000 inhabitants)44. The circles 
represent the raw council size, while the connected points are the predicted values 
from a linear model of the number of Councilors on municipality size. As Figure 
3.1 depicts, Council size is a step (or deterministic) function of population size, and 
                                                          
43 Since 1993, Mayors have been subject to a two-term limit (4 years each), while members of the 
Executive Committee and of the Municipal Council can be re-elected indefinitely. 
44 Roughly 6,324 municipalities in my sample have a population size lower than 30,000 that 
corresponds to 95 percent of observations in my sample. 
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in turn the methodology I can apply in order to recover the causal effect of interest 
is a Sharp Regression Discontinuity Design as described in the following sections. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Discontinuity in Council Size 
 
The Municipal Budget (Bilancio di Previsione) is the main instrument used to 
plan the economic and financial management of local governments in which all of 
the information on total inflows and outflows (Spese ed Entrate Totali) can be 
found. Total inflows are essentially divided into Current Inflows (Entrate Correnti), 
including Tax Revenues (Entrate Tributarie), Non-Tax Revenues (Entrate Extra-
Tributarie) and Transfers (Entrate per Trasferimenti) and Capital Inflows (Entrate 
in Conto Capitale), including Transfers of Funds for Investment projects 
(Trasferimenti di Fondi per Investimenti) and Mortgages (Assunzione di Mutui e 
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Prestiti Obbligazionari). Current Inflows are usually used to finance Current 
Outflows (Spese Correnti), including expenses borne for a day-to-day 
municipalities' management, whereas Capital Outflows (Spese in Conto Capitale) 
are usually financed through Capital Inflows.  
The Municipal Budget (Bilancio di Previsione) is the main instrument used to 
plan the economic and financial management of local governments in which all of 
the information on total inflows and outflows (Spese ed Entrate Totali) can be 
found. Total inflows are essentially divided into Current Inflows (Entrate Correnti), 
including Tax Revenues (Entrate Tributarie), Non-Tax Revenues (Entrate Extra-
Tributarie) and Transfers (Entrate per Trasferimenti) and Capital Inflows (Entrate 
in Conto Capitale), including Transfers of Funds for Investment projects 
(Trasferimenti di Fondi per Investimenti) and Mortgages (Assunzione di Mutui e 
Prestiti Obbligazionari). Current Inflows are usually used to finance Current 
Outflows (Spese Correnti), including expenses borne for a day-to-day 
municipalities' management, whereas Capital Outflows (Spese in Conto Capitale) 
are usually financed through Capital Inflows.  
My empirical analysis is based on a panel data set on municipalities’ budgets, 
provided by the Italian Ministry of the Internal Affairs, of approximately 6,576 
local governments, over the period 2001-2007. There is information on both 
Inflows and Outflows.  
Moreover, I have information on the identity, gender, age, education attainment 
and previous jobs of the elected Mayors, the Executive Committee Members and 
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the Municipal Councilors as well as on the number of Assessors and Councilors 
within the main municipal bodies.45 
To control for municipalities’ demographic characteristics, I use the 2001 Italian 
Census of Population (Censimento della Popolazione Italiana). I observe the size of 
resident population, the average level of employment, the education attainment of 
the population, the proportion of people aged 65 or over and the size of each 
municipality area.  
By merging these data sets, a sample of 42,381 observations for 7,070 Italian 
municipalities (from 2001 to 2007) has been obtained. Table 3.2 presents the 
descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis.  
 
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total Expenditures per capita (ln) 6.70 0.46 1.16 11.26 
Current Expenditures per capita (ln) 6.33 0.38 0.85 9.83 
Capital Expenditures per capita (ln) 6.07 0.84 5.26 11.80 
Council Size 14.73 4.40 12 60 
Population Size 7,122.1 41,015.62 31 2,546,804 
Employment 0.31 0.16 0.18 0.63 
Education of Population 7.30 0.82 2.57 12.57 
Municipal Area 37.14 50.07 1 1,499 
Income 8,749.34 4,460.83 1,133.43 52,226.91 
Elderly People (>=65) 0.20 0.07 0.04 0.64 
Dual Ballot 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Executive Committee Members’ Age 42.77 4.04 27.25 62 
Executive Committee Members’ Education 12.27 1.7 5 18 
Mayor’s Age 47.98 9.03 21 64 
Mayor’s Education 14.24 3.56 5 18 
Source: Local Administrators Data set (1985-2011), Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs; Italian Census of 
Population (2001). 
 
The first three variables reported in Table 3.2 are used as dependent variables in 
my empirical analysis and give me information on the local government size, as 
measured by Total Expenditures per capita (with a mean of 6.70), Current 
                                                          
45 Anagrafe degli amministratori Locali, Ministero dell’Interno http://amministratori.interno.it. 
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Expenditures per capita (with a mean of 6.33) and Capital Expenditures per capita 
(6.07 on average) in log terms. 
As regards to the number of members within each Municipal Council, on average 
Councilors are 15 with a standard deviation of 4.40. The quite small average council 
size highlights the small-medium size of Italian municipalities (a mean of 7,122 
inhabitants and average area size of 37.14 square kilometers). 
The average years of education in the population are 7, the ratio between the 
number of employed individuals and the total number of not elderly inhabitants is 
about 31% and the share of population aged more than 65 is 20%. Finally, roughly 
22% of municipalities in the sample have a population size above 15,000 
inhabitants and in turn, elections in these cities are held using a dual ballot system. 
As far as the Mayor and the Executive Committee members’ characteristics are 
concerned, I consider variables that provide information about their quality and 
experience (education attainment and age)46. In particular, the average age among 
Executive Committee members is 43, whereas Mayors in the sample are 48 years 
old on average. Further, Mayors seem to be more educated than Executive 
Committee members: the average years of education of Mayors (14) are higher than 
those of Executive Committee members (13). 
 
3.3  Methodology 
In this section I discuss the methodology implemented for my empirical analysis. 
Since the number of Councilors within the municipal apparatus is a deterministic 
                                                          
46 Similar measures of quality are used in De Paola and Scoppa (2011) and Baltrunaite et al. (2012). 
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function of a continuous variable, i.e. the population size, as highlighted by Figure 
3.1, I can implement a Sharp Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD).  
The idea behind the Sharp RDD is to compare municipalities just above the 
threshold to municipalities just below it: unobservable characteristics should not 
vary discontinuously around the cutoff and then the cutoff rule provides exogenous 
variations in the treatment “as good as a randomized experiment” (Lee, 2003). 
There are different ways to implement a Sharp RDD. I could estimate the effect 
of Council size on government size at each of the 7 cutoffs established by the Italian 
law and obtaining in turn 7 different effects. However, this methodology would 
require a lot of data around the cutoffs. As a consequence, I use, as in Per Petterson-
Lidbom (2012), a model allowing me to determine just one estimate for the effect 
of the Council size. More precisely, in my main analysis, I will use all the available 
data in the neighborhood of the first three thresholds using different bandwidths, i.e 
35, 25 and 20 percent above and below the cutoffs, and estimate the following 
model: 
 
[1]    log(𝑀𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑙 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑔(𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡) +  𝑋𝑖𝑡 +
+µ𝑝 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , 
            
where the dependent variable, 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑀𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡), is a measure 
of government size in logarithmic terms (i use three different measures of municipal 
expenditures: Total Expenditures per capita, Current Expenditures per capita and 
Capital Expenditures per capita),  𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑙 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 is a linear function of the number 
of observed Councilors within the Municipal Council, and g(.) is a polynomial 
function for population size. 
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Moreover, I add 𝑋𝑖𝑡 that is a vector of controls at the municipal level, including 
the area size in square kilometers of each municipality, the number of employed 
workers divided by not elderly inhabitants, the proportion of elderly people (i.e. 
people aged 65 or above), the average education attainment of resident citizens, 
measured in terms of years of schooling.47 I also consider province and year 
dummies µ𝑝 and 𝜇𝑡 respectively. 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term of my model. 
A potential issue related to the implementation of my methodology is related to 
the fact that in Italy, as stated by the Legislative Decree n. 267/2000, the number of 
legislators within the Municipal Council is not the only policy that changes around 
the population thresholds. Also Mayors and Executive Committee members’ wage 
varies discontinuously around the same thresholds that generate a discontinuity in 
the Council size. 
If there is another policy that depends on population size and shares the same 
population threshold, the effect of the Council size is confounded with the effect of 
this other policy and might not be identified. Paying higher salaries to politicians, 
according to the efficiency wage theory, may affects the way they manage public 
finance by increasing the incumbent's payoff from being reelected and by increasing 
the quality of elected officials (attracting more skilled individuals). An opposite 
prediction emerges from the model of Messner and Polborn (2004) and Matozzi 
and Merlo (2008) where an increase in the salary a politician receives while in office 
decreases the average quality of individuals who become politicians. 
                                                          
47 I also control for income per capita in some specifications that I decided to not report in the paper, 
because I observe this variable over the period 2001-2006 only and consequently, I lose observations 
for the year 2007. However, the magnitude and the sign of the effect of Council size on local 
expenditures tend to be very similar. 
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Since the wage earned by Italian mayors in each municipality is not observed 
and in order to take into account the potential identification issue mentioned above, 
I add another control vector 𝑍𝑖𝑡, that provides information on the quality and 
experience of elected politicians48, such as the age and education attainment 
(measured by years of schooling) of mayors, as well as the average age and 
education level of the elected Executive Committee members for each municipality. 
These variables should capture any selection effects on observable characteristics, 
as shown by Ferraz and Finan (2011)49.  
 
3.4  Smoothness Condition and other Potential Confounds 
The general concern with my identification strategy is the possibility that some 
other determinants of expenditures also exhibits a stepwise function or are 
discontinuous at the various cutoff points. The main assumption underlying my 
approach is that unobserved characteristics do not change discontinuously around 
population thresholds, i.e. the pre-determined characteristics of municipalities just 
above and below the thresholds are the same. Since information about unobserved 
characteristics of municipalities is not available, the focus is on observed 
                                                          
48 This vector does not include information about partisanship of elected politicians and mayors 
since at the municipal level in Italy most of the parties (especially those in municipalities with a 
population size lower than 5,000 inhabitants) belong to Liste Civiche, i.e. they are not part either of 
left or right wing).  
49 Ferraz and Finan (2011) examine whether higher wages attract better quality politicians and 
improve political performance using exogenous variation in the salaries of local legislators across 
Brazil’s municipal governments. The analysis exploits, like in my paper, discontinuities in wages 
across municipalities induced by a constitutional amendment defining caps on the salary of local 
legislatures according to municipal population. Since both the size of the legislature and the amount 
of block grant a municipality receives vary according to the population cutoff s, they take into 
account these potential confounds, by adding the amount of block grant and the legislature size as 
further control variables in their main specification. 
 
 
94 
 
characteristics, such as the average population’s level of education, the employment 
rate, the municipal area and the proportion of people aged 65 or above. Figure 3.2 
presents these municipal characteristics plotted against population close to the first 
three cutoff points. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Discontinuity in the Pre-determined Characteristics 
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Each figure depicts population cell means of the municipal characteristic for the 
first three population thresholds (which represents 95 percent of the observations) 
along with the fitted values of a locally weighted regression calculated within each 
segment. The other cutoffs are excluded for presentational purposes. However, 
including these additional observations does not affect the results. In general, the 
figures show only small differences at each threshold points. 
 
Table 3.3: Test for Difference-in-Mean 
Window 1: ±35% 
 Threshold 3,000 Threshold 10,000 Threshold 30,000 
 Sample Size Difference Sample Size Difference Sample Size Difference 
Education Attainment 10,385 -0.003 5,788 -0.115*** 1,891 -0.180*** 
Employment 10,021 0.005* 5,649 0.006 1,875 -0.014* 
Area 10,385 -3.013*** 5,788 -4.764*** 1,891 -13.183*** 
Elderly People 10,385 0.006*** 5,788 0.002* 1,891 0.005** 
Window 2: ±25% 
 Threshold 3,000 Threshold 10,000 Threshold 30,000 
 Sample Size Difference Sample Size Difference Sample Size Difference 
Education Attainment 7,488 0.004 3,855 -0.122 1,249 -0.162*** 
Employment 7,223 0.012*** 3,775 -0.001 1,233 -0.012 
Area 7,488 -3.289*** 3,855 -6.160*** 1,249 -11.494** 
Elderly People 7,488 0.001* 3,855 -0.002* 1,249 0.005** 
Window 3: ±20% 
 Threshold 3,000 Threshold 10,000 Threshold 30,000 
 Sample Size Difference Sample Size Difference Sample Size Difference 
Education Attainment 5,845 0.020 2,979 -0.116 963 -0.158** 
Employment 5,616 0.019** 2,914 -0.003 954 -0.028 
Area 5,845 -2.098** 2,979 -6.677** 963 -10.023* 
Elderly People 5,845 0.001 2,979 -0.006 963 0.002 
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Moreover, as a further specification test, I present in Table 3.3, a difference-in-
mean test for the pre-determined characteristics mentioned above. In particular, I 
test whether there is a statistically significant difference in terms of municipal 
characteristics among municipalities just above and below the first three population 
thresholds, by considering the discontinuity samples with a bandwidth of 35, 25, 
and 20 percent above and below the thresholds respectively. In absence of 
manipulation, municipalities around the population thresholds should not differ 
significantly in terms of observable and unobservable variables.  
As shown in Table 3.3, municipal characteristics are statistically different for the 
different groups of municipalities when I consider a bandwidth of 35 percent, but 
the significance of the difference in mean tends to disappear when municipalities in 
a smaller range around the thresholds are compared. This reassures me about the 
random assignment around the threshold points (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008). As 
not all of the variables are balanced and to avoid any bias due to the lack of balance 
I control for these variables in the regressions. 
Another potential threat to my research design comes from the possibility that 
other government policies are discontinuous at the same cutoffs. Although I find no 
evidence that other characteristics of the municipalities change discontinuously at 
these cutoff points, the amount of grants transferred to Italian municipalities by 
State and Regions might vary according to the population size, as established by 
the Italian law (Legislative Decree n. 267/2000). In Table 3.4, I present the results 
of an OLS regression, in which I regress the capital and current transfers (per capita) 
received by central government and regions on the population cutoffs50 and I 
control for municipal characteristics and for quadratic and cubic population 
                                                          
50 I take into account only those cut-offs where the Council size varies discontinuously, based on the 
Italian law. 
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polynomials. Again I find that the amount of grants provided to municipalities does 
not change discontinuously around the population cutoffs used in my analysis. 
 
Table 3.4: Discontinuity in State and Region Capital and Current Grants- OLS Results 
    Capital Transfers (State and 
Regions)   
Current Transfers (State and 
Regions) 
    (1) (2) 
  
(3) (4) 
Threshold_3,000   -23.882 -23.612   -143.201 -137.586 
    (15.477) (15.853)   (114.766) (114.546) 
Threshold_10,000   9.2028 10.059   8.664 26.536 
    (10.004) (11.144)   (72.975) (72.662) 
Threshold_30,000   20.710 22.909   120.185 165.916 
    (14.734) (17.997)   (108.743) (114.521) 
Threshold_100,000   55.369 57.942   446.248 499.338 
    
(34.050) (38.678)   (330.610) (349,741) 
Threshold_250,000   82.465 74.468   556.395 588,607 
    (70.709) (55.968)   (399.134) (380,201) 
Threshold_500,000   129.691 48.630   1,245.027 -249,699 
    (136.548) (119.926)   (818.999) (1,178,134) 
Threshold_1,000,000   56.203 -9.837   679.114 -700,650 
    (70.633) (136.945)   (533.614) (958.512) 
              
Population Polynomial   Second Third   Second Third 
Municipal Controls   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Ex. Com and Mayors' 
Controls 
  
Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Year and Province dummies   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
              
Observations   48,306 48,306   48,669 48,669 
R-squared   0.007 0.007   0.018 0.018 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is indicated on the top of each column. Standard errors, corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and adjusted for potential clustering at the municipal level, are reported in parenthesis. The 
symbols ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant, respectively, at the 1, 5, and 10 percent 
level.  
 
 
3.5  Empirical Results: Sharp RDD Estimates 
In Table 3.5 I report the Sharp RDD estimates, in which local expenditures are 
measured by Total Expenditures per capita and Current Expenditures per capita in 
logarithms respectively.  
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In order to choose the correct specification of g(.), data has been analyzed and a 
linear or quadratic polynomial generally provides a good approximation.  
In all the specifications, I control for municipalities’ characteristics, Mayor and 
Executive Committee members’ characteristics and year and province dummies. 
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and allowing for clustering at the 
municipality level to account for possible serial correlation in the errors within 
municipalities, as suggested by Bertrand et al. (2004). 
In column (1) in which I focus on total expenditures per capita, using a 
bandwidth of 35 percent above and below the population thresholds and I consider 
a second order polynomial for population size, I find a negative and statistically 
significant effect of Council size on total expenditures. If the Council size increases 
by 1 unit, the total municipal expenditures decrease by 0.6 percent. Moreover, the 
magnitude and the sign of the Council size effect on total expenditures do not 
change dramatically in column (2) and (3) where I use a bandwidth of 25 and 20 
percent around the cutoff points51. 
I can justify my findings in this way: an increase in the number of Councilors 
within the apparatus leads to a decrease in the municipal expenditures, since the 
local administration becomes more efficient. This is the case when, for example, a 
conflict between legislatures and bureaucrats rises about the level of expenses: 
bureaucrats usually tend to prefer higher level of expenses than politicians. The idea 
behind this agency problem is that elected legislators cannot make all policy 
decisions because of time constraints (it is sufficient to think that some members of 
Municipal Council can work in the private sector too) and consequently, they must 
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delegate some decisions to the administrative officials (see for example, Weingast 
and Moran,1983). The activity of monitoring and control of bureaucrats is costly 
and usually time-consuming. Thus, increasing the number of legislators may lead 
to a better control of the public administration and to an increase in its efficiency 
(Per Petterson-Libdom, 2011). Furthermore, legislators are the custodians of the 
“public purse”, and they become more efficient at their task as the degree of 
specialization in the legislature increases (Crain et al., 1985). 
In order to understand this agency conflict and consequently, how the efficiency 
of the local administration may be affected by the executive fragmentation, from 
column (4) to (6), I replicate the same specifications as those presented in columns 
(1) to (3), but I measure the local government size by expenses that are more directly 
under control of bureaucrats, i.e. Current Expenditures per capita (as mentioned 
before they refer to expenses borne for a day-to-day management of municipalities) 
including, among others, operating expenditures. It would have been interesting to 
investigate the effect of Council size on operating expenditures, but no detailed 
information on specific items that are part of current expenditures is available in 
my dataset. To the best of my knowledge, it is highly likely that bureaucrats have a 
higher decision-making authority on current expenditures than on capital expenses. 
Also in this case, the results show that the effect of the legislature size on Current 
Expenditures per capita is negative and statistically significant at 5 percent level 
(see column (5)). The Current Expenditures per capita decrease by 0.4 percent in 
case of an increase in the Council size by 1 unit.  
All in all, it can be concluded that the number of members within the Municipal 
Council is relevant to explain the variation in Current Expenditures per capita: an 
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increase in the number of Councilors leads to a better monitoring of bureaucrats in 
terms of spending, mitigating the agency problems and heightening the efficiency 
of the entire local public administration.  
 
Table 3.5: Local Expenditures and Council Size- Sharp RDD 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
VARIABLES Tot 
 Exp  
per capita  
(ln) 
Tot  
Exp  
per capita  
(ln) 
Tot  
Exp 
 per capita  
(ln) 
Current Exp  
per capita 
(ln) 
Current 
Exp  
per capita 
(ln) 
Current 
Exp  
per capita 
(ln) 
Surplus 
 (ln) 
        
Council Size -0.0064*** -0.0046** -0.0048** -0.0076*** -0.0044** -0.0041** 0.0781*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0017) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0043) 
Constant 5.665*** 5.543*** 5.709*** 5.399*** 5.219*** 5.372*** 4.433*** 
 (0.129) (0.185) (0.135) (0.102) (0.141) (0.102) (0.221) 
        
Bandwidth +/-35% +/-25% +/-20% +/-35% +/-25% +/-20% +/-20% 
Population Polynomial Second Second First Second Second First First 
Municipal Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ex. Com. and Mayors’ 
Controls 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Province 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16,377 11,312 8,760 16,377 11,312 8,760 8,759 
R-squared 0.397 0.399 0.422 0.461 0.464 0.497 0.810 
Notes: The dependent variable is indicated on the top of each column. Standard errors, corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and adjusted for potential clustering at the municipal level, are reported in parenthesis. The 
symbols ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant, respectively, at the 1, 5, and 10 percent 
level.  
 
To enforce the idea that a higher number of council members can improve the 
efficiency/productivity of the local public administration, in column (7) I explore 
the effect of Council size on the municipal budget surplus, as measured by the 
difference between total revenues minus total expenditures. Results actually show 
a positive and statistically significant effect at 1 percent level of my variable of 
interest on municipal budget surplus: if Council size increases by 1 unit municipal 
surplus increases by 7.8 percent roughly. 
Furthermore, Table 3.6 focuses on the theory proposed by Weingast et al. (1981) 
in which pork barrel plays an important role in explaining the relationship of 
interest. Hence, legislators, following the logrolling and trying to obtain some 
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benefits in terms of re-election, tend to implement large investment projects 
granting an advantage to some specific groups of citizens to the detriment of the 
general community. In fact, under the logrolling hypothesis, Councilors can use in 
a wrong way municipal inflows to build private roads, to fix sewage systems or to 
open new recreation grounds at the request of a particular group of constituencies. 
For this reason, in order to test the prediction of Weingast et al. (1981) model on 
the oversupply of public projects, Capital Expenditures per capita has been used as 
a dependent variable for two main reasons: first, this variable is widely considered 
in the literature as a good proxy for the size of public projects; and second, expenses 
related to operations of maintenance and implementation of public works are 
included in Capital Expenditures. 
 
Table 3.6: Pork Barrel Policies and Council Size- Sharp RDD Results 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
VARIABLES Capital Exp 
per capita 
(ln) 
Capital Exp  
per capita  
(ln) 
Capital Exp  
 per capita  
(ln) 
    
Council Size -0.0170*** -0.0117*** -0.0110*** 
 (0.00270) (0.00298) (0.00312) 
Constant 5.097*** 4.834*** 4.930*** 
 (0.134) (0.170) (0.161) 
    
Bandwidth +/-35% +/-25% +/-20% 
Population Polynomial Second Second First 
Municipal Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Ex. Com. and Mayors’ 
Controls 
Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Province dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16,377 11,312 8,760 
R-squared 0.272 0.29 0.302 
Notes: The dependent variable is indicated on the top of each column. Standard errors, corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and adjusted for potential clustering at the municipal level, are reported in parenthesis. The 
symbols ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant, respectively, at the 1, 5, and 10 percent 
level.  
 
As in the previous analysis, the coefficient of the Council size is negative and 
statistically significant at 1 percent level for the specification in column (1): an 
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increase by 1 unit in the legislature size leads to a decrease in the capital expenses 
by 1 percent. These results, suggesting that there is no pork barrel politics in Italian 
Municipalities, are in contrast with those predicted by the Weingast’s model.  
 
3.6  Robustness Checks 
In this section I check the robustness of my results. Firstly, as a first robustness 
check, I re-estimate my original model by trimming the outcome variables at 1 
percent from top and bottom of the distribution (1st and 99th percentiles). Secondly, 
I offer some additional evidence on the fact that my estimates are not affected by 
the change in the Mayor’s wage varying at the same thresholds defining the Council 
size. 
3.6.1 Regression with trimmed Outcome Variables 
In Table 3.7 I present results coming from a Sharp RDD, in which the distribution 
of all of local expenditures measures (dependent variables) is trimmed, i.e where 
the top 1% and bottom 1% of  local government size is set to missing. In particular, 
in column (1) government size is measured by total spending per capita, in column 
(2) by current expenditures, whereas in column (3) by capital expenditures. In all 
regressions I control for the full set of controls, for year and province dummies and 
for a first order polynomial of the forcing variable. Furthermore, the bandwidth 
chosen is 20 percent above and below the cutoffs. 
Again results show that Council size has a negative and statistically significant 
(at conventional level) effect on all of measures of local government size. Findings 
are very similar both in terms of magnitude and significance when I impose “bottom 
codes” and “top codes” to provide a common calculation of lower and upper limits, 
i.e. a method often referred as “winsorising”,  where the top 1% and bottom 1% of 
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local government spending are set respectively to the value of the 1st and 99th 
percentile, when I use different bandwidth as well as when the top 5% and bottom 
5% of  local government spending is set to missing (results not presented but 
available upon request). 
 
Table 3.7: Trimmed Outcome Variables and Council Size- Sharp RDD Results 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
VARIABLES Total Exp 
per capita 
(ln) 
Current Exp  
per capita  
(ln) 
Capital Exp  
 per capita  
(ln) 
    
Council Size -0.005** -0.003* -0.011*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Constant 5.710*** 5.310*** 4.933*** 
 (0.135) (0.113) (0.161) 
    
Bandwidth +/-20% +/-20% +/-20% 
Population Polynomial First First First 
Municipal Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Ex. Com. and Mayors’ 
Controls 
Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Province dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,754 8,600 8,757 
R-squared 0.427 0.503 0.302 
Notes: The dependent variable is indicated on the top of each column. Standard errors, corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and adjusted for potential clustering at the municipal level, are reported in parenthesis. The 
symbols ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant, respectively, at the 1, 5, and 10 percent 
level.  
 
 
3.6.2 Exogenous Variation in the Council Size: Mayor’s Wage Threat 
As stated before, the Council size is not the only policy that varies discontinuously 
around the population thresholds. Also Mayors and Executive Committee 
members’ wages change around the same cutoffs. To take into account this problem 
in previous estimates I have controlled for the experience and quality of elected 
Mayors and Executive Committee members. 
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Unfortunately there are no thresholds at which only the Council size varies. 
However there are some thresholds at which there is no change in the Council size 
but only a change in Mayor and Executive Committee members’ wage. Hence, as 
a final robustness check, to enforce my idea that the impact of Council size on the 
municipal expenditures is not confounded with the effect produced by the Mayor 
and Executive Committee members’ salary, I focus close to the only three 
population thresholds52 that uniquely identify a wage increase, i.e. 1,000, 5,000 and 
50,000. In particular, I use a Local Linear Regression (LRR) with a bandwidth of 
20 percent above and below the thresholds, where I regress all the measures of the 
municipal expenditures on dummy variables taking a value equal to 1 if the 
observations are above the thresholds and 0 otherwise, and I control for 
municipality characteristics, Mayors and Executive Committee members’ 
characteristics as well as for a first order population polynomial. However, since 
the LLR, as stated by Lee (2003), usually requires very large sample sizes around 
the thresholds, I decide to not consider the 50,000 threshold because of observations 
lack in the neighborhood of the cutoff. Table 3.8 presents the results. 
I find that the coefficients on the cutoff indicators, that estimate the effect of the 
increase in wage at each threshold point, are not statistically significant for almost 
all the specifications53. I found just a significant effect of the increase in the wage 
on Capital Expenditures per capita around the 5,000 threshold. Moreover, the effect 
tends to be positive, so the higher the salary earned by Mayors and Executive 
Committee members, the larger the municipal expenditures. This gives support to 
                                                          
52 I choose a bandwidth of 20 percent above and below the population cutoffs. The results are the 
same also when I choose a different bandwidth. Data is available upon request. 
53 The coefficient on the cutoff indicators is always statistically insignificant also when I choose 
different bandwidth around the population thresholds. 
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the idea that the negative effect on municipal expenditures is due uniquely to an 
increase in the number of legislators within the municipal Council. 
Table 3.8: The Effect of Mayors Wage on Municipal Expenditures: LLR Results with a 
Bandwidth of ±20% 
    Total Expenditures per        
capita (ln) 
Current Expenditures per 
capita (ln) 
Capital Expenditures per 
capita (ln) 
    (1) (2) (3) 
Threshold_1,000   -0.021 -0.027 0.064 
    (0.023) (0.019) (0.057) 
Threshold_5,000   -0.046 -0.014 0.238*** 
    (0.042) (0.019) (0.063) 
          
Population Polynomial   First First First 
Municipal Controls   
Yes Yes Yes 
Ex. Com and Mayors' 
Controls   
Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Province dummies   Yes Yes Yes 
Observations   10,184 10,184 9,889 
R-squared   0.460 0.495 0.216 
Notes: The dependent variable is indicated on the top of each column. Standard errors, corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and adjusted for potential clustering at the municipal level, are reported in parenthesis. The 
symbols ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant, respectively, at the 1, 5, and 10 percent 
level.  
 
 
3.7  Concluding Remarks 
A large body of literature has concentrated on how politicians make decisions, and 
how the number of legislators affects governments' budgets. The general results in 
the literature have shown a positive effect of legislature size on government size, 
although the source of variation used in the empirical works is likely to be 
endogenous (see Baqir, 2001; Bradbury and Crain, 2001; Bradbury and Stephenson, 
2003; and Gilligan and Matsusaka; 1995, 2001. The only exceptions are the analysis 
of Egger and Koethenbuerger (2010), Hirota and Yunoue (2012) and Per-Petterson-
Lidbom (2012), which find however mixed results. In this way, not only the 
theoretical model proposed by Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen (1981), but also the 
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causal interpretation of results presented in the previous papers have been 
questioned. 
In this paper I have empirically investigated the causal effect of legislature size 
on local expenditures for Italian municipalities over the period 2001-2007 using a 
Sharp Regression Discontinuity Design. I find a negative relationship between 
Council size and municipal expenditures, as measured by Total Expenditures per 
capita, i.e. increasing the number of members within the Council apparatus leads to 
a greater ability to control bureaucrats and consequently to a higher level of 
productivity in the public administration. 
There are strong reasons to believe that these results are internally valid, i.e. 
Council size is causally correlated to municipal expenditures, since the source of 
variation used to identify the effect of the variable of interest is exogenous. 
As robustness check, I test the Weingast et al. model (1981) on pork barrel 
policies, focusing on Capital Expenditures per capita. Again I highlight a negative 
and statistically significant effect of Council size on capital expenditures, used as a 
proxy for the size of projects implemented by legislators, showing that there is no 
pork barrel politics at the municipal level in Italy, and in turn, casting some doubts 
on the Weingast et al. model (1981). Furthermore, in order to reinforce the 
hypothesis that an agency problem in terms of spending could rise between 
legislators and bureaucrats, I have focused on expenditures that are more directly 
under control of bureaucrats, i.e. Current Expenditures per capita, showing again a 
negative effect of legislature size on government size at the municipal level in Italy.  
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Conclusions 
 
In the first chapter of my thesis I empirically studied the effect produced by one of 
the intrinsic characteristics of candidates running for a mayor position, i.e. the 
incumbency status, on electoral turnout at the municipal level in Italy over the 
period 1993-2011.    
In the literature it has been shown that having a rich set of information on 
candidates’ characteristics reduces the cost anchored to casting the vote and in turn, 
it boosts the probability that voters go to the polls (Dawson and Zinser, 1976; 
Chapman and Palda, 1983). 
Being informed is important to make the right decision, especially in electoral 
contexts characterized by low levels of information where electors rely on 
heusistics to choose who vote among a long list of candidates: a candidate will be 
favored compared to others only if the voter feels well represented. 
This is the reason why some candidates’ characteristics, such as the gender 
(McDermott, 1997), the race (Sigelman et al., 1995), the sexual orientation 
(Golebiowska, 2001; Herrick and Thomas, 1999) and the employment (McDermott, 
2005), have been investigated in the literature as determinants of voter turnout. 
The focus of the first chapter is on the incumbent officeholder, as a potential 
variable explaining the variation in the electoral participation. My empirical 
findings show a positive but not statistically significant effect, when I control for 
the "closeness" of the electoral race, of the incumbency status on my outcome 
variable. However, the impact of incumbency is heterogeneous across geographical 
areas (South vs North). In particular, I highlight how the incumbency does not affect 
turnout in northern municipalities, but it produces a positive and statistically 
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significant effect in the South: this is essentially due to the fact that the southern 
part of Italy, compared to the North, is characterized by low levels of social capital 
and by clientelistic relationships established by incumbent politicians. The same 
results hold true also when I look separately at municipalities in the lower and upper 
quartile of the social capital distribution, as measured by blood donation, and at 
municipalities characterized by high or low density of organized crime. 
In the second chapter I studied the personal incumbency effect on the probability 
of winning the electoral competition at the municipal level in Italy over the period 
1993-2011. In a democracy, incumbents usually get some advantages that non-
incumbent challengers do not have and if they use their political influence to remain 
in power, voters will have a limited influence on their policy decisions (Linden, 
2004). 
My findings show a personal incumbency advantage since incumbents are more 
likely to win the competition compared to their challengers. Furthermore, when I 
focus on municipalities located in the South and in the North of Italy in order to 
take into account, as I said before, the dissimilarity in the level of social capital and 
income between these two geographical areas, I find that in both areas the 
incumbent has a personal advantage in terms of winning the election, although the 
effect of interest is larger in magnitude for northern municipalities compared to 
southern municipalities. One potential explanation is that when population plagued 
with high levels of poverty, deficient public services, and with its basic necessities 
unsatisfied lives in an area of “endemic discontent” (Molina, 2001), it will be hard 
for the incumbent in the southern municipalities to satisfy the majority of voters 
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and as a consequence, candidates in power will suffer a loss in terms of winning the 
electoral competition compared to candidates holding power in the North. 
Finally, in the third chapter I investigated the effect of legislature size on local 
government spending in Italy over the period 2001-2007. Results show a negative 
relationship between the variable of interest and municipal expenditures. This 
means that by increasing the number of legislators the level of productivity in the 
public administration increases, since legislators are able to control bureacrats’ 
activity easily. 
Moreover, in order to reinforce the hypothesis that an agency problem in terms 
of spending could rise between legislators and bureaucrats, I have focused on 
expenditures that are more directly under control of bureaucrats, i.e. Current 
Expenditures per capita, showing again a negative effect of legislature size on 
government size at the municipal level in Italy.  
Also, the “Law of 1/n” theory on pork barrel policies has been tested, finding a 
negative and statistically significant effect of legislature size on capital 
expenditures, showing that there is no pork barrel politics at the municipal level in 
Italy. 
Overall, the policy implications of my thesis are twofold. First, chapter 1 and 2 
highlight the importance of using term limits in modern democracies also at the 
local level in Italy. In fact, in many representative democracies, many elected 
officials can obtain too much power or authority over time, making their 
representation of the citizens less representative. Term limits prevents politicians 
misbehavior, ensuring that no one can focus more on keeping a job and a certain 
level of power, than representing the public. This way, decisions will be made more 
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carefully, because if a public official knows that he will only have the opportunity 
to hold a particular job for a certain number of years, even if re-elected, he will not 
be as likely to consider public service as a career. Moreover, politicians have 
developed over the course of time, a reputation for being corrupt and unconcerned 
with their constituents. The common thread with most politicians that have become 
more corrupt seems to be the length of time most of them have served. Usually, it 
seems that corruption seems to happen as time goes on in the career of a 
politician. Term limits seem to make this less likely because there is less time that 
a politician can be influenced by the power of the office that they hold. 
This scenario clearly emerged from my research. In fact, I find that incumbent 
politicians not only build relationship based on the log-rolling in the poorest areas 
of Italy, having the chance to divert public resources and to use “red-tape 
procedures” and private information in order to obtain exchange votes, but also 
have an advantage in winning the electoral race compared to their challengers. 
With this regard, my future research aims at investigating the direct effect of 
term limit on electoral participation at the local level in Italy. Term limits might 
affect voter turnout through different channels. First, they may increase voter 
participation by making elections more competitive and dynamic. Second, they may 
increase voter confusion and disinterest by introducing a greater number of 
unknown non-incumbents into electoral contests, leading to lower turnout. Third, 
particularly at the time of the introduction of the institutional change, media 
coverage of local elections may increase significantly, decreasing the costs of 
acquiring relevant information for voting. 
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In particular, the Italian law that came into force in 2013 introduced a three-term 
limit for mayors in municipalities with a population size lower than 3,000 
inhabitants. This allows me to have a treatment group (municipalities affected by 
the reform with a population size lower than 3,000) and a control group 
(municipalities not affected by the reform with a population size larger than 3,000). 
I will use a Difference-in-discontinuity design, by combining the before/after with 
the discontinuous policy variation at the 3,000 population size cutoff. Finding a 
statistically significant effect between treatment and control group would cast some 
doubts on the exogeneity of the instrument used in the first chapter of my thesis. 
The second implication of my thesis, coming from the third chapter, is that a 
higher number of legislators leads to an improvement of the efficiency/productivity 
of the public administration, essentially due to a better control of bureacrats, and 
mitigates in turn, the conflict of interest between politicians and administrative 
officials. 
Future research on this topic suggests to investigate if the relationship between 
legislature size and government spending is non-monotonic (U-shape relationship). 
In fact, it may be the case that when legislature size is small, then an increase in the 
number of legislators leads to a better monitoring of bureaucrats in terms of 
spending, heightening the efficiency of the entire public administration. 
Conversely, the efficiency of the local administration might tend to reduce if 
legislature size is big enough to guarantee a good management of the "public 
pursue". Unfortunately, Italian data does not allow to investigate this kind of 
relationship since legislature size is a step function of population size. Hence, I need 
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to focus on a different country, and to adopt the correct methodology to recover the 
causal effect of interest, so that my results will have an external validity. 
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